CAJ | 학술논문

考虑产品生产过程中碳减排对需求的影响，将碳交易和碳排放约束融入企业利润函数，研究供应商与制造商势之间的减排博弈；设计一种自执行旁支付契约，解决以往旁支付契约供应链协调过于强调博弈参与方自发参与而未能有效考虑系统利润增量分配合理性与公平性的问题，并进行数值分析。研究表明：当制造商和供应商之间为斯坦伯格博弈时，主导者可以通过提高减排量引导跟随者也提高减排量；当制造商和供应商之间执行完全信息静态博弈时，企业可在决策前释放提高减排量的可信信号，使双方都提高减排量；新的旁支付自执行契约，可使决策双方依靠个人理性的分散决策取得集体理性的集中决策效果。
고필산품생산과정중탄감배대수구적영향，장탄교역화탄배방약속융입기업리윤함수，연구공응상여제조상세지간적감배박혁；설계일충자집행방지부계약，해결이왕방지부계약공응련협조과우강조박혁삼여방자발삼여이미능유효고필계통리윤증량분배합이성여공평성적문제，병진행수치분석。연구표명：당제조상화공응상지간위사탄백격박혁시，주도자가이통과제고감배량인도근수자야제고감배량；당제조상화공응상지간집행완전신식정태박혁시，기업가재결책전석방제고감배량적가신신호，사쌍방도제고감배량；신적방지부자집행계약，가사결책쌍방의고개인이성적분산결책취득집체이성적집중결책효과。
In this paper, the effect of carbon emission reduction in the manufacturing process on production demand is emphasized under carbon trading regulation and carbon emissions constraints. A side-payment self-enforcing contract is designed to resolve the problem that spontaneity of participa- tion in side-payment contracts design based on supply chain coordination is over emphasized while ra- tionality and fairness of allocation of profit increment is not considered. And the numerical analysis is given. As a result, in Stackelberg game setting, the leader can induce the follower to make bigger cuts in their emissions by increasing its carbon emission reduction; in complete information static state game setting, company can help increase the total carbon emission reduction of the supply chain with a credible signal on improving emission reduction before making a decision; with the new side-payment self-enforcing contract decentralized decision according to individual rationality incurs a collective rea- son effect in the centralized setting.