CAJ | 학술논문

从承包商视角下将前景理论引入不完全信息演化博弈,得出了治理注册建造师执业不良行为的充分条件及影响因素;在充分考虑双方利益相关性的条件下引入薪酬激励,构建了薪酬变动对注册建造师执业行为影响模型.研究结果表明：注册建造师诚信执业的成本前景值要小于处罚风险、声誉与经济损失和不良行为收入的前景值之和,并且小于因诚信执业带来的外部性收益;若不能形成诚信执业与监管成本的恰当心理感知,将无法杜绝不良行为发生;薪酬变动在一定条件下会影响注册建造师执业行为,但仅依靠薪酬激励可能形成负面影响;薪酬激励失效情况下必须强化执业过程管理与外部监督,加大对不良行为的惩罚力度.
종승포상시각하장전경이론인입불완전신식연화박혁,득출료치리주책건조사집업불량행위적충분조건급영향인소;재충분고필쌍방이익상관성적조건하인입신수격려,구건료신수변동대주책건조사집업행위영향모형.연구결과표명：주책건조사성신집업적성본전경치요소우처벌풍험、성예여경제손실화불량행위수입적전경치지화,병차소우인성신집업대래적외부성수익;약불능형성성신집업여감관성본적흡당심리감지,장무법두절불량행위발생;신수변동재일정조건하회영향주책건조사집업행위,단부의고신수격려가능형성부면영향;신수격려실효정황하필수강화집업과정관리여외부감독,가대대불량행위적징벌력도.
Based on prospect theory, the paper constructs extensive-form games that uses prospect values as values of gain （loss） from the view of general contractor. The paper concludes the sufficient conditions and influence factors of governance of professional misconduct. The paper explains the paradox of reality that professional misconduct occurs frequently but con- struction administration department adopts few regulatory measures to manage. Under the condition of fully considering inter- ests correlation, the paper introduces incentive compensation and concludes that compensation changes can affect profession- al misconduct under certain conditions. The result show that incentive compensation may have a negative impact, and the contractor must strengthen process management and external supervision, and intensify punishment to professional miscon- duct.