CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于双重委托代理框架，构建了公司治理主体的权力博弈对股权激励的影响路径分析模型，并运用2007—2012年中国民营中小上市公司面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现：作为民营中小上市公司的核心治理主体，经营层与终极控制人的权力博弈对股权激励强度及其双重效应均具有显著影响。具体而言，经营层权力对股权激励强度具有显著的正向影响，终极控制人权力则对其产生负向影响，两者在对股权激励强度作用的过程中存在冲突，终极控制人权力对股权激励强度的负向作用更为强烈；股权激励对第一类代理成本具有抑制效应，而在经营层权力与终极控制权力的双重调节效应下，这种抑制效应更为凸显；股权激励对第二类代理成本的作用并不显著，但这种作用过程同样受到来自两类权力双重调节效应的显著影响。
본문기우쌍중위탁대리광가，구건료공사치리주체적권력박혁대고권격려적영향로경분석모형，병운용2007—2012년중국민영중소상시공사면판수거진행실증분석。연구발현：작위민영중소상시공사적핵심치리주체，경영층여종겁공제인적권력박혁대고권격려강도급기쌍중효응균구유현저영향。구체이언，경영층권력대고권격려강도구유현저적정향영향，종겁공제인권력칙대기산생부향영향，량자재대고권격려강도작용적과정중존재충돌，종겁공제인권력대고권격려강도적부향작용경위강렬；고권격려대제일류대리성본구유억제효응，이재경영층권력여종겁공제권력적쌍중조절효응하，저충억제효응경위철현；고권격려대제이류대리성본적작용병불현저，단저충작용과정동양수도래자량류권력쌍중조절효응적현저영향。
Based on double - layer principle - agent framework, we construct a model to analyze the impact path of power game of governance bodies on equity incentive, and do the empirical research by using the panel data of private small and medium -sized listed companies during 2007 -2012 in China. The results show that： the power game has significant impacts both on equity incentive intensity and its double effects. Specifically, managerial power and ultimate controller power have positive and negative influence on the equity incentive intensity respectively; there is a conflict in the process, the ultimate controller power＇ s negative impact shows more obviously; the negative effect of equity incentive on agency cost I becomes more significant in the dual moderating effect of the two powers; the impact of equity incentive on agency cost II is not significant, but this process is also moderated by the two powers simultaneously.