CAJ | 학술논문

本文以政府补助为切入点,以2007-2010年中国A股上市公司的5118个样本为研究对象,通过分析约束性不同的政府补助对薪酬差距及其激励效应的影响,检验了高管权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程.本文研究发现：（1）高管权力的存在会使政府补助成为其“伪装”业绩的指标,从而增加高管薪酬,进而加大公司内部的薪酬差距.并且这种现象在国有企业中比在民营企业中表现得更为突出;（2）高管利用政府补助增加其薪酬的权力受制于政府补助的约束性.仅在政府补助约束性较弱的情况下,政府补助才会增加高管薪酬,加大薪酬差距;（3）从政府补助影响薪酬差距的经济后果来看,政府补助导致的薪酬差距会削弱薪酬差距对公司未来业绩的正向影响.同时,软约束补助对薪酬差距激励效应的削弱作用更大.
본문이정부보조위절입점,이2007-2010년중국A고상시공사적5118개양본위연구대상,통과분석약속성불동적정부보조대신수차거급기격려효응적영향,검험료고관권력통과정부보조작용우신수차거적구체과정.본문연구발현：（1）고관권력적존재회사정부보조성위기“위장”업적적지표,종이증가고관신수,진이가대공사내부적신수차거.병차저충현상재국유기업중비재민영기업중표현득경위돌출;（2）고관이용정부보조증가기신수적권력수제우정부보조적약속성.부재정부보조약속성교약적정황하,정부보조재회증가고관신수,가대신수차거;（3）종정부보조영향신수차거적경제후과래간,정부보조도치적신수차거회삭약신수차거대공사미래업적적정향영향.동시,연약속보조대신수차거격려효응적삭약작용경대.
By exploring the special institution background of subsi- dy in China and using 5118 Chinese listed companies＇ observations from 2007 to 2010, this article analyzes how the subsidy with different constraints affects the pay gap between executives and employees and explains the positive relation between subsidy and pay gap using managerial power theory. According to the managerial power theory, the executives can ＂disguise＂ the accounting performance by the government subsidy, as the executive compensation is based on the accounting performance, the subsidy which is recorded in gains as part of net income will increase the executive compensation and create a larger intra-company pay gap. The positive relationship be- tween subsidy and pay gap is more significant in the State-Owned Enterprises than that of private enterprises, and is most prominent in the State-Owned enterprises owed by local government, which indicates that executives in the State-Owned enterprises have more power to let subsidy increase their compensation and especially the executives in local government controlled State-Owned enterprises. We further check the subsidy with different constraints by using hand collected data, we find that the positive relationship between subsidy and pay gap only exit when subsidy is with soft constraints, and no significant relation between subsidy with hard constraints and pay gap, which shows that the power of the executives to in- crease their compensation by using government subsidy is con- strained by the government subsidy＇s constraints and supervisions. Finally, we check the economic consequence of government sub- sidy＇s effect on the pay gap and we find that the pay gap generated by the government subsidy will write off the pay gap＇s tournament effect, that is to say, it weakens the pay gap＇s positive incentive influence on the company＇s future performance. The weakening ef- fect is bigger when the subsidy is with fewer constraints. By testing the relationship between subsidy and pay gap, we are expecting to explain how managerial power works differently in SOEs and non- SOEs and also how managerial power will be constrained differently when subsidy is with hard constraints or soft constraints.