CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过构建董事会资本模型,将董事会人力资本和社会资本组合划分为董事会资本丰富性和深入性,并分别考察两者对公司治理水平的影响效应.基于代理理论和资源依赖理论观点,我们通过布罗异质性指数来考察董事会资本丰富性,得出董事会资本丰富性对公司治理水平的提高具有显著的正效应;同时,通过董事会成员特性比例来考察董事会资本深入性,得出董事会资本深入性在一些方面对公司治理水平具有显著负效应.由此,本文的研究结论在一定程度上支持了董事会资本对公司治理水平的影响,并认为通过董事会资本的合理配置,可以提高公司治理水平.
본문통과구건동사회자본모형,장동사회인력자본화사회자본조합화분위동사회자본봉부성화심입성,병분별고찰량자대공사치리수평적영향효응.기우대리이론화자원의뢰이론관점,아문통과포라이질성지수래고찰동사회자본봉부성,득출동사회자본봉부성대공사치리수평적제고구유현저적정효응;동시,통과동사회성원특성비례래고찰동사회자본심입성,득출동사회자본심입성재일사방면대공사치리수평구유현저부효응.유차,본문적연구결론재일정정도상지지료동사회자본대공사치리수평적영향,병인위통과동사회자본적합리배치,가이제고공사치리수평.
In this paper, we use data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2012 to examine the effect of Board Capital on Corporate Governance. We develop a model of board capital, which is composed of the heterogeneity and embeddedness of directors＇ human and social capital, and try to find out the effect of the above two on corporate governance. Recognizing the interdependent nature of the human and social capital of directors, we propose the model the can isolate the relevant aspects of the human and social capital of the directors with respect to their resource provision capa- bility and aggregate these aspects from the individual to the board level. Building upon agency theory and resource dependence theory, we use Blau＇s heterogeneity index in order to analyze the heteroge- neity of board capital and we submit that the heterogeneity of board capital leads to better corporate governance. In this part, firstly, we discuss the heterogeneity of board capital on directors＇ function has no statistically significant effect on corporate governance. Secondly, we find that the heterogeneity of board capital on directors＇ occu- pation is significantly propitious to corporate governance strategy. Thirdly, we believe that the heterogeneity of board capital on di- rectors＇ part-time job also significantly raises the level of corporate governance. On the other hand, we use the percentage of the boards ＇characteristics to analyze the embeddedness of board capital and we believe that the embeddedness of board capital has some adverse effects on corporate governance. In this part, we find that directors with the in-depth experiences in the industry of sample firms have negative effect on corporate governance. But directors with two or more part-time jobs in the industry of sample firms are positive to corporate governance. Consequently, the result of this paper partial supports the hypothesis of the effect of board capital on corporate governance.