华东经济管理
華東經濟管理
화동경제관리
East China Economic Management
2014年
5期
31~36
,共null页
完全市场覆盖 不完全市场覆盖 公办养老机构 民办养老机构 地理位置
完全市場覆蓋 不完全市場覆蓋 公辦養老機構 民辦養老機構 地理位置
완전시장복개 불완전시장복개 공판양로궤구 민판양로궤구 지리위치
full market coverage; incomplete market coverage; public pension institution; private pension institution; location
文章在考虑养老机构竞争受地理位置影响的基础上,建立了公办养老机构与民办养老机构的博弈模型。结果表明:老年人分布结构变化对公办及民办养老机构的利润带来相反方向的变化,且不完全市场覆盖下老年人分布结构变化对养老机构的影响程度更大;当政府对养老机构投入差距较小时,民办养老机构选址可以离公办莽老机构更近,当投入差距较大时.选址应适当离公办养老机构更远;老年人对距离的厌恶程度越大,完全市场覆盖情形下养老机构的利润有所增加,不完全市场覆盖情形下的养老机构利润有所减少;养老机构周边老年人密度越大,服务成本系数差距及距离厌恶系数对其利润的影响越大。
文章在攷慮養老機構競爭受地理位置影響的基礎上,建立瞭公辦養老機構與民辦養老機構的博弈模型。結果錶明:老年人分佈結構變化對公辦及民辦養老機構的利潤帶來相反方嚮的變化,且不完全市場覆蓋下老年人分佈結構變化對養老機構的影響程度更大;噹政府對養老機構投入差距較小時,民辦養老機構選阯可以離公辦莽老機構更近,噹投入差距較大時.選阯應適噹離公辦養老機構更遠;老年人對距離的厭噁程度越大,完全市場覆蓋情形下養老機構的利潤有所增加,不完全市場覆蓋情形下的養老機構利潤有所減少;養老機構週邊老年人密度越大,服務成本繫數差距及距離厭噁繫數對其利潤的影響越大。
문장재고필양로궤구경쟁수지리위치영향적기출상,건립료공판양로궤구여민판양로궤구적박혁모형。결과표명:노년인분포결구변화대공판급민판양로궤구적리윤대래상반방향적변화,차불완전시장복개하노년인분포결구변화대양로궤구적영향정도경대;당정부대양로궤구투입차거교소시,민판양로궤구선지가이리공판망로궤구경근,당투입차거교대시.선지응괄당리공판양로궤구경원;노년인대거리적염악정도월대,완전시장복개정형하양로궤구적리윤유소증가,불완전시장복개정형하적양로궤구리윤유소감소;양로궤구주변노년인밀도월대,복무성본계수차거급거리염악계수대기리윤적영향월대。
Based on impacts of location on the competitiveness among pension institutions, the paper builds the game model of public pension institutions and private pension institutions. The results show that: lhe change of the elderly distribution structure will bring opposite effects to the profits of both public and private pension institutions, and the greater effects under the incomplete market coverage; when the public funds from the government are smaller, the location of private pension insti tutions should be closer to public pension institutions, when the public funds from the government are larger, the location of private pension institutions should keep away from public pension institutions; the aversion of elderly to distance is more, the profits of pension institutions will increase under the full market coverage, while the profits of pension institutions will decrease under the incomplete market coverage; the greater the elderly density around pension institutions, the greater the gap of ser vice cost coefficient and the distance aversion coefficient to the profits.