CAJ | 학술논문

公司治理是嵌入在更高层级的制度背景中的。对于中国的国有企业和非国有企业来说，由于其历史原因和存在目的不同，导致了它们处于完全不同的制度背景之中，这也使得它们表面上相似的公司治理安排具有不同的治理效果。在本文中，通过对比中国上市企业中的国有企业和非国有企业的财务绩效及高管权力对高管离职的影响，本文发现，国有企业和非国有企业的公司治理具有完全不同的效果。具体地，在非国有企业中，影响高管离职的两大主要因素——财务绩效和高管权力——对国有企业高管离职的降低作用都比较弱甚至不存在。这证明了公司治理是嵌入在制度背景中的，国有企业的公司治理嵌入在更高层级的国有企业体制中，因此，其治理效果显示出与非国有企业的巨大不同。本文对公司治理理论、针对公司治理有效性和针对中国企业的公司治理的研究具有重要意义。
공사치리시감입재경고층급적제도배경중적。대우중국적국유기업화비국유기업래설，유우기역사원인화존재목적불동，도치료타문처우완전불동적제도배경지중，저야사득타문표면상상사적공사치리안배구유불동적치리효과。재본문중，통과대비중국상시기업중적국유기업화비국유기업적재무적효급고관권력대고관리직적영향，본문발현，국유기업화비국유기업적공사치리구유완전불동적효과。구체지，재비국유기업중，영향고관리직적량대주요인소——재무적효화고관권력——대국유기업고관리직적강저작용도비교약심지불존재。저증명료공사치리시감입재제도배경중적，국유기업적공사치리감입재경고층급적국유기업체제중，인차，기치리효과현시출여비국유기업적거대불동。본문대공사치리이론、침대공사치리유효성화침대중국기업적공사치리적연구구유중요의의。
Recent studies have been arguing that corporate governance and its effects are embedded in a more macro institutional context. However, few studies have empirically tested the embeddedness of corporate governance and its effects. Responding to this new call of research in corporate governance field, this study tries to empirically test the embeddedness of corporate governance and its effects by taking advantage of the Chinese context. China it- self provides a perfect context with different institutional contexts. Because of historical reasons, the business system of China is built upon two significantly different kinds of firms, state-owned ones （SOEs） and private-owned ones （non-SOEs）. SOEs are supervised and controlled by the government or government affiliated institutions, while non- SOEs are owned by private individuals or firms. Therefore, Chinese state-owned enterprises （SOEs）and non-state- owned enterprises （ non-SOEs）, considering of their different history and goals, are embedded in totally different in- stitutional contexts. Also, similarly, the motives and goals of executives in SOEs and those in non-SOEs are embed- ded in different institutional contexts and therefore differ from each other. Therefore, although quite alike, the corpo- rate governance arrangements of SOEs and non-SOEs have completely different effects. Considering of the ineffectiveness of corporate governance and concurrent different institutional regimes in Chi- na, combining institutional theory with power theory in explaining the executive succession phenomenon in China is especially important and necessary. In this study, we compared the effects of financial performance and executive powers on executive succession hazards in Chinese publicly listed SOEs and non-SOEs and find that, the corporate governance in SOEs and non-SOEs indeed have quite different effects. In detail, the effects of financial performance and executive power, the two most important factors influencing executive succession in non-SOEs, are both quite weak or even don＇ t exist in SOEs. Executive power can be categorized into three kinds, structural, ownership and expert. By using the data of Chinese A-share publicly listed companies, this study empirically tested that the effects of economic performance and all three kinds of powers on executive succession are weaker in SOEs than in non- SOEs. This implies that corporate governance is embedded in the specific institutional contexts that the focal firm is in. In conclusion, the corporate governance of SOEs is embedded in the more macro SOE system, while that of non- SOEs is more embedded in the market economy context. This results in huge difference in governance effects in SOEs with those in non-SOEs. By focusing on the embeddedness of corporate governance and its effects, this study will have crucial contribu- tions for the corporate governance theories, studies focused on corporate governance effects and effectiveness, and the corporate governance research focused on Chinese firms. First, this study supplements to existing theories on corpo- rate governance. On the one hand, including institutional contexts can not only disclose the contingency effects of power in different institutional contexts, but also avoid the endogeneity problems. On the other hand, integrating pow- er theory provides a stronger perspective in explaining top executive succession in a context where institutions are less market-oriented and would result in governance ineffectiveness. Second, this study empirically proved that power is embedded in institutional contexts at a more macro level. SOEs and non-SOEs represent for different institutional contexts in China. Organizational level factors such as power, attention, and decision-making process are proved to be embedded in the specific institutional contexts. Finally, this study provides some insights for research focused on Chinese firms. Different from developed countries, China has experienced a planning economy period and transition to market economy. Institutional contexts therefore are more complex and have changed a time. This requires scholars to pay extra attention to contextual factors and potential endogeneity problems now is in lot along when re- searching into Chinese firms.