CAJ | 학술논문

基于宏观经济因素分析的现有理论不能解释一同的反倾销行为（反倾销申诉和裁决）在不同行业问分布的显著差异。行业贸易竞争力、行业生产效率、市场结构以及行业的政治关联性等行业异质性特征，对不同行业的反倾销行为影响显著。行业进口渗透率会正向影响行业反倾销申诉和裁决，而行业的出口量仅对反倾销裁决产生负向影响。行业生产效率对反倾销申诉带来负向影响，但与反倾销申诉裁决的通过率呈倒U形关系。行业企业数量则与反倾销诉讼的申请频率呈U形关系，但正向影响裁决的通过率。行业的政治关联性则仅对反倾销裁决起显著正向影响。
기우굉관경제인소분석적현유이론불능해석일동적반경소행위（반경소신소화재결）재불동행업문분포적현저차이。행업무역경쟁력、행업생산효솔、시장결구이급행업적정치관련성등행업이질성특정，대불동행업적반경소행위영향현저。행업진구삼투솔회정향영향행업반경소신소화재결，이행업적출구량부대반경소재결산생부향영향。행업생산효솔대반경소신소대래부향영향，단여반경소신소재결적통과솔정도U형관계。행업기업수량칙여반경소소송적신청빈솔정U형관계，단정향영향재결적통과솔。행업적정치관련성칙부대반경소재결기현저정향영향。
Why are anti-dumping measures frequently used in some industries, but rarely used in others？ The existing researches have not yet invested sufficient efforts in analyzing and interpreting the significant differences across industries in a country＇s anti-dumping actions. Based on the antidumping and industry-specific data of China, India and USA from 1997 to 2011, we set up empirical models to investigate how antidumping appeals and adjudications are affected by the heterogeneous properties of different industries. We constructed variables, including the trading corfipetitiveness of industries, their productivity, market structure and political influence, to capture the heterogeneities, and adopted the panel regression methods of Poisson distribution and classified assessment. The empirical results indicatethat ~ （1） The higher import penetration, the larger impact of imports on the industry concerned, which corresponds to an increase in the number of anti-dumping lawsuits and the passing rate of anti-dumping measures in adjudications. However, the higher export volume of trade, the lower passing rate in anti-dumping adjudications, that is, in anti-dumping ruling the administrative authority will take the issue of trade retaliation into account. （2） The higher productivity of the industry, the smaller impact of its imports, thus the lower number of anti-dumping lawsuits. However, the passing rate of anti-dumping adjudications indicates an inversed-U shaped relationship with industrial productivity. In other words, to protect the industries the anti dumping ruling of the administrative authority must be weighed against the efficiency loss. When the efficiency of a particular industry is low, the administrative authority will reduce the willingness to protect; on the contrary, higher industrial productivity results in less necessity of anti dumping protection. （3） The number of anti-dumping lawsuits has a U-shaped relationship with the degree of market monopoly. It turns out that the industry with more number of enterprises and more scattered distribution of their scales will suffer more from the impact of imports, thus the frequency of anti-dumping lawsuits will be higher. As industry concentration increases by numbers of enterprises decreasing, the crowding-out effect of import on small enterprises would increase the profit of leading enterprises, thereby reducing their willingness to file anti-dumping proceedings. When the degree of market monopoly is high, the crowding-out effect of import on small enterprises decreases, and leading enterprises will be faced with greater competition, thereby increasing anti-dumping lawsuits. The higher concentration of the industry possessing, the larger the political influence on administrative authority, and hence the higher passing rate in adjudications. （4） The political connections of an industry will not affect the frequency of anti-dumping lawsuits, but they will significantly increase the probability that the administrative authority may rule and implement anti-dumping measures. And such kind of results are not affected by national differences. This paper provides evidences and preliminary conclusions for further in-depth research on industrial factors which affect anti-dumping actions. It also provides a possible framework and a theoretical basis for export countries in terms of how to circumvent anti-dumping sanctions.