CAJ | 학술논문

中国排污权交易市场尚不完善．若初始排污权的分配结果与现有排污量差异过大。排污方不能及时调整生产方式或结构与之相适应。同时又无法顺利在市场上购买到所必须的排污权量，排污方的经济社会发展将会受到阻碍。基于此。提出了总量控制下流域初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式：一部分排污权按照现状排污比例进行分配。另一部分排污权实行竞争性分配。重点研究了排污权的竞争性分配决策：提出了由排污管理者制定柔性决策参数，排污方在柔性参数约束下进行自主竞争的初始排污权配置机制；建立了总量控制下初始排污权分配的竞争性决策模型。模拟排污方在排污管理者的总体控制下以“自身排污配比最大化”为目标通过交互评价的方式参与初始排污权的分配过程。柔性决策参数的构建反映了排污权管理者对初始排污权分配的公平性、高效性原则的整体把握；排污方在柔性权重下以“自评”和“它评”为主要形式进行交叉评价，体现了排污方在排污权分配中的“发言权”和“参与权”；排污权管理者对排污方交叉评价结果的集结．实质上是对排污方之间的“利益”进行协调。在初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式中，竞争性分配的排污权比例取决于流域内排污方的经济社会发展对排污量变化的“敏感度”，排污方经济社会发展对排污量变化的“敏感度”越高，竞争性分配的比例的取值宜越小，反之越大。同时。可根据排污交易市场的建设进度．逐步提高竞争性分配排污权的比例。分阶段实现流域排污权的动态分配，最终达到对排污权进行高效、公平分配的目标。以北江流域为例进行了分析，给出了排污权分配总量中竞争性分配比例取不同值时，北江流域6个城市排污权分配的动态结果。中國排汙權交易市場尚不完善．若初始排汙權的分配結果與現有排汙量差異過大。排汙方不能及時調整生產方式或結構與之相適應。同時又無法順利在市場上購買到所必鬚的排汙權量，排汙方的經濟社會髮展將會受到阻礙。基于此。提齣瞭總量控製下流域初始排汙權的競爭性混閤分配方式：一部分排汙權按照現狀排汙比例進行分配。另一部分排汙權實行競爭性分配。重點研究瞭排汙權的競爭性分配決策：提齣瞭由排汙管理者製定柔性決策參數，排汙方在柔性參數約束下進行自主競爭的初始排汙權配置機製；建立瞭總量控製下初始排汙權分配的競爭性決策模型。模擬排汙方在排汙管理者的總體控製下以“自身排汙配比最大化”為目標通過交互評價的方式參與初始排汙權的分配過程。柔性決策參數的構建反映瞭排汙權管理者對初始排汙權分配的公平性、高效性原則的整體把握；排汙方在柔性權重下以“自評”和“它評”為主要形式進行交扠評價，體現瞭排汙方在排汙權分配中的“髮言權”和“參與權”；排汙權管理者對排汙方交扠評價結果的集結．實質上是對排汙方之間的“利益”進行協調。在初始排汙權的競爭性混閤分配方式中，競爭性分配的排汙權比例取決于流域內排汙方的經濟社會髮展對排汙量變化的“敏感度”，排汙方經濟社會髮展對排汙量變化的“敏感度”越高，競爭性分配的比例的取值宜越小，反之越大。同時。可根據排汙交易市場的建設進度．逐步提高競爭性分配排汙權的比例。分階段實現流域排汙權的動態分配，最終達到對排汙權進行高效、公平分配的目標。以北江流域為例進行瞭分析，給齣瞭排汙權分配總量中競爭性分配比例取不同值時，北江流域6箇城市排汙權分配的動態結果。
중국배오권교역시장상불완선．약초시배오권적분배결과여현유배오량차이과대。배오방불능급시조정생산방식혹결구여지상괄응。동시우무법순리재시장상구매도소필수적배오권량，배오방적경제사회발전장회수도조애。기우차。제출료총량공제하류역초시배오권적경쟁성혼합분배방식：일부분배오권안조현상배오비례진행분배。령일부분배오권실행경쟁성분배。중점연구료배오권적경쟁성분배결책：제출료유배오관리자제정유성결책삼수，배오방재유성삼수약속하진행자주경쟁적초시배오권배치궤제；건립료총량공제하초시배오권분배적경쟁성결책모형。모의배오방재배오관리자적총체공제하이“자신배오배비최대화”위목표통과교호평개적방식삼여초시배오권적분배과정。유성결책삼수적구건반영료배오권관리자대초시배오권분배적공평성、고효성원칙적정체파악；배오방재유성권중하이“자평”화“타평”위주요형식진행교차평개，체현료배오방재배오권분배중적“발언권”화“삼여권”；배오권관리자대배오방교차평개결과적집결．실질상시대배오방지간적“이익”진행협조。재초시배오권적경쟁성혼합분배방식중，경쟁성분배적배오권비례취결우류역내배오방적경제사회발전대배오량변화적“민감도”，배오방경제사회발전대배오량변화적“민감도”월고，경쟁성분배적비례적취치의월소，반지월대。동시。가근거배오교역시장적건설진도．축보제고경쟁성분배배오권적비례。분계단실현류역배오권적동태분배，최종체도대배오권진행고효、공평분배적목표。이북강류역위례진행료분석，급출료배오권분배총량중경쟁성분배비례취불동치시，북강류역6개성시배오권분배적동태결과。
With the incomplete emissions trading market in China, if the difference between the initial emission rights allocation results and existing current emission conditions is too large, the polluters can＇ t adjust the social production mode or structure timely, and the market can＇ t supply with the necessary emission rights, the economic and social development will be impeded. Based on this, competitive mixed model of emissions allocation is proposed： a part of emission rights distribution is in accordance with the current ratio, and another part is distributed competitively. Competitive allocation decision methods is focus on： Initial emission rights allocation mechanism is proposed that emission regions compete on allocation proportion independently with flexible decision parameters given by emission manager departments, and then competitive decision model of initial emission rights under total quantity control is put forward. It is simulated in the model that polluters participate in the emission rights allocation decision process equally taking ＇ self discharge ratio maximization＇ as goal under the overall control by emission managers. Uncertain decision parameters reflect fairness, efficiency principles grasped by emission rights managers. Cross evaluation among the polluters by evaluating self and others reflects the polluters＇＇ voice＇ and ＇ participation rights＇ in the process of emission rights allocation decision ; polluters＇ cross evaluation results aggregation by emission rights managers is essentially the coordination of polluters＇＇ interests＇. In the competitive mixed initial emissions allocation method, the ratio of competitive allocation depends on the economic and social development＇ s sensitivity degree to emissions. When the sensitivity degree is large, the value of competitive allocation ratio should be small. Otherwise the competitive allocation ratio should be large. At the same time, according to the emission trading market construction progress, competitive allocation ratio should be increased gradually, thus the dynamic emission allocation can be realized in phase and efficient, fairness distribution target can be reached. Taking Beijiang River Basin as an empirical analysis example, the dynamic allocation results of six cities in Beijiang River Basin are given with different values of competitive allocation ratio in the total emission rights.