心理科学
心理科學
심이과학
Psychological Science
2014年
3期
710~715
,共null页
信任 合适性框架 目标激活关系预期
信任 閤適性框架 目標激活關繫預期
신임 합괄성광가 목표격활관계예기
trust, appropriate frame, goal activation, relationship expectation
人际互动过程中,信任作为决策过程受到诸多因素的影响,信任的决策逻辑在不同的研究背景中存在冲突。本研究以合适性逻辑为理论基础,关系持续预期为激活规范目标的变量,分析了存在互动关系持续预期和不存在互动关系持续预期对信任决策的影响及其影响机制。结果表明:(1)被试间存在关系持续时,信任水平较高;关系持续预期消失时,信任水平显著下降。(2)被试对关系持续的重要性感知与其信任决策显著相关。(3)情境中的目标未被激活时,个体的信任倾向与信任决策显著相关;而当情境目标被激活时,信任倾向与信任决策相关不显著。
人際互動過程中,信任作為決策過程受到諸多因素的影響,信任的決策邏輯在不同的研究揹景中存在遲突。本研究以閤適性邏輯為理論基礎,關繫持續預期為激活規範目標的變量,分析瞭存在互動關繫持續預期和不存在互動關繫持續預期對信任決策的影響及其影響機製。結果錶明:(1)被試間存在關繫持續時,信任水平較高;關繫持續預期消失時,信任水平顯著下降。(2)被試對關繫持續的重要性感知與其信任決策顯著相關。(3)情境中的目標未被激活時,箇體的信任傾嚮與信任決策顯著相關;而噹情境目標被激活時,信任傾嚮與信任決策相關不顯著。
인제호동과정중,신임작위결책과정수도제다인소적영향,신임적결책라집재불동적연구배경중존재충돌。본연구이합괄성라집위이론기출,관계지속예기위격활규범목표적변량,분석료존재호동관계지속예기화불존재호동관계지속예기대신임결책적영향급기영향궤제。결과표명:(1)피시간존재관계지속시,신임수평교고;관계지속예기소실시,신임수평현저하강。(2)피시대관계지속적중요성감지여기신임결책현저상관。(3)정경중적목표미피격활시,개체적신임경향여신임결책현저상관;이당정경목표피격활시,신임경향여신임결책상관불현저。
Trust decision is studied in different research logics, and affected by various variables. This study attempted to approach trust decision in a systematic way and focused on the relational signals in initial interactivities, and considered the expectation for endur- ing relationship as a goal activator. Based on this theoretical perspective, the author operated on three assumptions. First, when the normative goal is not activated, people make trust decisions on their trust propensity. Second, when there is a strong expectation for en- during relationship, people will behave at a higher trust level. Third, at the end of a repeated game, the level of trust will decline dra- matically. To test these assumptions, this study took a trust game as the experimental situation. Four subjects did experiments together and two of them acquired the investor - agent relationship randomly. All these four subjects did the experiments in separated cubes to reduce the effect of Chinese mianzi, which may interfere with people's behavior due to special interpersonal relationship. In this repeated trust game, subjects' role would change randomly to make the investor and agent have equal power. This study manipulated three sections of investor - agent relational duration to change the expectation of enduring relationship. In one short game, the investor - agent relation only lasted one round ; and in this research, it was a weak situation. In the repeated game, the investor - agent relationship lasted five rounds. At the first round of five, subjects had a strong expectation of enduring relationship, while at the last round, people's expecta- tion declined. These two rounds activated two different goals. In infinite repeated game, the investor -agent relation would last at the 80% probability, or the relationship would be ended. To test the validity of operation, this study asked subjects to answer a seven- point scale "how important for you to maintain the relationship?" How people make trust decisions in specific situation? To answer this question, subjects responded to a survey of trust propensity before the trust game, and then researchers measured their trust decision in specific trust game to clarify the relation of trust propensity and situational goal. Careful analysis yielded several results. First, trust propensity and trust decision were significantly related when situation was not clearly identified. The correlation of trust propensity and trust decision wasn't significant in repeated games. This indicated that subjects' character had a weaker influence than situational goal. Second, the importance of maintaining a relationship and trust decision were sig- nificantly related. This indicated the validity of experiment operation, also it showed the relationship between the expectation of an en- during relationship and the normative goal to maintain the relationship. Third, the level of trust declined significantly when the subjects found relationship would be over. It was an interesting result, which indicated the social situation and the economic situation may have the same effect as reward and punishment.