CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立“双种群”复制动态模型，研究了有限理性假设下“多对多”讨价还价的策略演化问题，证明了只有严格纳什均衡才能成为“多对多”讨价还价的演化稳定策略．并利用计算机仿真发现：当买卖双方种群的初始策略为随机分布时，讨价还价的演化稳定策略以最大概率收敛到对称纳什均衡，产生买卖双方最大初始期望收益乘积的纳什均衡可以比较准确地预测“多对多”讨价还价的演化稳定策略，且演化过程不必是单调的．研究内容有助于理解“多对多”讨价还价的达成协议的一般规律，为设计多边谈判支持系统提供参考和借鉴．
통과건립“쌍충군”복제동태모형，연구료유한이성가설하“다대다”토개환개적책략연화문제，증명료지유엄격납십균형재능성위“다대다”토개환개적연화은정책략．병이용계산궤방진발현：당매매쌍방충군적초시책략위수궤분포시，토개환개적연화은정책략이최대개솔수렴도대칭납십균형，산생매매쌍방최대초시기망수익승적적납십균형가이비교준학지예측“다대다”토개환개적연화은정책략，차연화과정불필시단조적．연구내용유조우리해“다대다”토개환개적체성협의적일반규률，위설계다변담판지지계통제공삼고화차감．
By constructing a model of replicator dynamics with two disjoint populations, this paper studies the evolution of strategies in a many-to-many bargaining based on the assumption that traders are boundedly rational. It is proved that only strict Nash equilibriums can be the evolutionarily stable strategy （ESS） in the bargaining. Simulation results show that the ESS converges to the symmetric Nash equilibrium with the maximal probability if fractions of buyers＇ and sellers＇ strategies are randomly initialized. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium, which generates the maximal product of initial expected return of two sides, accurately predicts the ESS in most cases. Finally, the evolutionary process of ESS is not necessary to be monotonous. The result helps to understand the general pattern in which a many-to-many bargaining comes to terms, and serves as reference for designing multilateral negotiation support system.