CAJ | 학술논문

提前期压缩是企业在激烈竞争环境中赢得与保持竞争优势的一种有效方式.本文制定了一个交易信用（即零售商向供应商提前付款）契约,讨论了可控提前期下非一体化供应链中的库存协作问题,得到了供应商与零售商的最优策略组合.研究表明,当提前期压缩成本系数足够小时,供应商采用所设计的交易信用契约,能够在满足零售商个体理性约束的前提下,赚取可观的成本节约金额,而且比纯粹延期付款协调零售商订货行为时所获得的成本节约更多;并且通过对该成本节约的合理分配,实现了供应商与零售商成本境况的帕累托改进乃至整条供应链的协调.最后的数值分析考察了安全库存系数、提前期需求波动、或者供应商的资金投资收益率对供应链最优策略与成本节约幅度的影响.
제전기압축시기업재격렬경쟁배경중영득여보지경쟁우세적일충유효방식.본문제정료일개교역신용（즉령수상향공응상제전부관）계약,토론료가공제전기하비일체화공응련중적고존협작문제,득도료공응상여령수상적최우책략조합.연구표명,당제전기압축성본계수족구소시,공응상채용소설계적교역신용계약,능구재만족령수상개체이성약속적전제하,잠취가관적성본절약금액,이차비순수연기부관협조령수상정화행위시소획득적성본절약경다;병차통과대해성본절약적합리분배,실현료공응상여령수상성본경황적파루탁개진내지정조공응련적협조.최후적수치분석고찰료안전고존계수、제전기수구파동、혹자공응상적자금투자수익솔대공응련최우책략여성본절약폭도적영향.
In an increasingly competitive market,enterprises usually need to make a quick response to customers＇ demand in order to win and maintain competitive advantages.Time-based Competition （TBC） has been the popular competitive mode for firms that manufacture products or provide services.As Tersine points out,lead-time reduction within the supply-production-distribution chain is the mechanism for time-based competition.Based on a two-level supply chain which is composed of a single supplier and a single retailer,this paper firstly considers that the supplier can exert control or dominance over lead-time,and treats lead-time as the supplier＇s decision variable.Secondly,we introduce trade credit,referred to as prepayment or payment in advance,as a coordination mechanism,which can often be observed in many firms＇ business activities.Thirdly,we investigate the supplier and retailer＇s decision-making processes with trade-credit contract designed in the non-integrated supply chain,and obtain supply chain members＇ optimal joint strategies including ordering quantities,the expediting factor of lead-time,and prepaid credit period.Finally,a numerical experiment is conducted to verify the proposed model and relevant results.In summary,we find that：（i） The retailer＇s optimal ordering quantities increase when the expediting factor of lead-time drops.Thus,the supplier could reasonably induce the retailer＇s ordering behavior by controlling lead-time; （ii） If the value of cost coefficient of lead-time reduction is small enough,as compared with the initial situation,the supplier is able to earn very considerable cost savings through implementing trade-credit （i.e.prepayment） contract,which are even more than those in the scenario where the supplier allows the retailer a permissible delay in payment.At the same time,the retailer ‘ s initial annual average cost doesn＇t rise at all.Therefore,the retailer＇s individual rationality constraint is still satisfied.（iii） The supplier＇s optimal length of lead-time will be significantly shortened as the value of safety stock factor or the variance of lead-time demand increases.（iv） With the enhancement of the supplier＇s rate of return on capital investment,the retailer＇s optimal order quantities will decrease,the optimal length of lead-time will become shorter,the optimal prepaid period will be longer,and the whole supply chain will earn more cost savings; （v） Depending upon their relative risk-aversion degree,the supplier and the retailer can equally allocate the earned cost savings through the Nash bargaining model,realize the Pareto improvement of their cost status,and ultimately achieve the coordination of the entire supply chain.