CAJ | 학술논문

市场中时常发生的供不应求的情形催生了大量投机者.针对这种情况,本文考虑了不同维度下顾客的异质化因素,在模型中分别引入投机信任危机和顾客缺货效用损失的概念,将顾客细分;通过厂商定价以调节投机者数量来最大化厂商利润,得出厂商的最优定价策略和投机者的均衡数量,优化供应链.最后采用Matlab进行数值分析,验证模型的适用性,同时证明投机信任危机减弱将使投机者接受一个更高的原始价格,缺货效用损失系数越大的顾客越倾向于提早购买.
시장중시상발생적공불응구적정형최생료대량투궤자.침대저충정황,본문고필료불동유도하고객적이질화인소,재모형중분별인입투궤신임위궤화고객결화효용손실적개념,장고객세분;통과엄상정개이조절투궤자수량래최대화엄상리윤,득출엄상적최우정개책략화투궤자적균형수량,우화공응련.최후채용Matlab진행수치분석,험증모형적괄용성,동시증명투궤신임위궤감약장사투궤자접수일개경고적원시개격,결화효용손실계수월대적고객월경향우제조구매.
Stock-out problems often occurs after the rapid growth of consumer purchasing power,especially in the market of popular commodities.These problems become opportunities for speculators in the resale market.In general,speculators are profitable especially when production capacity cannot keep up with the actual demand.However,the resale market involves demand uncertainty risks in the beginning of the sales period.The public generally denounces speculators for extracting profits from consumers and harming the interests of manufacturers.Some speculating behaviors （e.g.ticket scalping） are even forbidden according to Chinese laws.Despite of these regulations,some existing researches show that the presence of speculators may increase a firm＇s expected profit as long as the firm is charging a fixed retail price because speculators often act as an intermediary for the firm to adopt dynamic pricing strategy.As a result,speculators unintentionally do some favors for some firms and it is also profitable for these firms to allow speculators to enter the market under certain conditions.In reality,not all of customers are willing to buy from speculators as more and more mercenary peddlers are selling fake and low-quality products in China.Moreover,some prudent consumers may have strong psychological distrust towards speculators because of their bad reputation,and no official guarantees for products carried by speculators,Therefore,confidence crisis reduces speculators＇ potential customer group size,thereby reducing profit margin and influencing speculators＇ behaviors.When stock-out problems happen,both consumers and firms suffer loss.Even though their valuation towards the product may turn out to be the same,different consumers may have different utility loss,which significantly affects strategic consumers＇ decision of buying now or later when they face stock-out problems.This is because the consumption value measured by the monetary value cannot reflect the real utility perception of a consumer to some degree.For example,two football fans have same valuation of a football match ticket,and one fan is much richer than the other one.When both of them face stock-out problem,the poorer one will be much more depressed than the rich one since the same monetary value shows different perceived values for the same football ticket as the two persons are not in the same income level.In order to describe consumer characteristics from different perspectives,including the differences in customers＇ attitudes towards speculators and their utility loss of stock-out,we introduce the concept of Speculative Crisis of Confidence and Consumer＇s Utility Loss of Stock-out in our model to simulate heterogeneous consumers in two ways.In general,we divide consumers into different types from four perspectives：strategic and myopic consumers,high valuation and low valuation consumers,consumers who will never buy products from speculators and who think it is indifferent to buy products from the firm and speculators,as well as consumers with different Consumer＇s Utility Loss of Stock-out.This paper considers a two-stage supply chain with a monopolist firm that sells a fixed capacity facing uncertain demand consisting of a certain part and a random part.The same market has no substitute products and large numbers of potential speculators.The firm sets a price at the beginning of the first stage before demand uncertainty is resolved to control the number of speculators that enter the market in order to maximize its own profit.The speculators enter the market at the first stage after seeing the retail price purely with the intention of reselling at the second stage,which can be profitable if the demand turns out to be high at the second stage.Afterwards,different types of consumers strategically choose when and where to purchase to maximize their own expected utility.In the first part,with the introduction of Speculative Crisis of Confidence we present a basic model with a fixed retail price,which can also mimic dynamic pricing outcomes for the firm by facilitating resale.In the second part,we do equilibrium analysis of the basic model using backward induction.In the third part,we define the concept of Consumer＇s Utility Loss of Stock-out by extending the basic model to a dynamic pricing model and obtaining the equilibrium solutions.By solving the equilibrium conditions of the two abovementioned models,the supplier＇s optimal pricing strategy and the equilibrium number of speculators of the two models are characterized to show the optimization strategy of the supply chain under different conditions.These results show the incentives of supply chain members could affect their options and reflect the interactions between their decisions.At last,in order to verify the application of the two models we conduct a numerical analysis using Matlab,which gives a real example of how different members of a supply chain make their choices under different conditions.The findings also indicate that （1）speculators can receive a higher price with the reduction of the degree of Speculative Crisis of Confidence,and （2） consumers with greater Consumer＇s Utility Loss of Stock-out Coefficient tend to make purchasing decisions in advance.