CAJ | 학술논문

本文在理性预期均衡的框架下,研究面临策略型消费者时,供应链上下游企业作为一个利益共同体如何更好地进行机制设计与契约选择的问题.本文首先分析零售商与顾客之间的理性预期问题,在此基础上对供应链批发价契约和回购契约下的供应链绩效及其影响因素进行比较.本文的研究结果表明：在存在顾客策略行为的情况下,回购契约比批发价契约更加可以激励零售商提高订购量,促使零售商保持较高的售价;当消费者对产品的价值估计值越高、批发价格越低、生产成本越高时,回购契约会更加有利于零售商.并且,当顾客对产品的价值估值超过一定的阈值点时,供应链利润最大时回购契约下的最优订购量大于批发价契约下的最优订购量.但是,供应链利润最大时,回购契约与批发价契约下的供应链利润大小关系则不确定.此外,本文还讨论了同时考虑策略型消费者和消费者退货的情形.
본문재이성예기균형적광가하,연구면림책략형소비자시,공응련상하유기업작위일개이익공동체여하경호지진행궤제설계여계약선택적문제.본문수선분석령수상여고객지간적이성예기문제,재차기출상대공응련비발개계약화회구계약하적공응련적효급기영향인소진행비교.본문적연구결과표명：재존재고객책략행위적정황하,회구계약비비발개계약경가가이격려령수상제고정구량,촉사령수상보지교고적수개;당소비자대산품적개치고계치월고、비발개격월저、생산성본월고시,회구계약회경가유리우령수상.병차,당고객대산품적개치고치초과일정적역치점시,공응련리윤최대시회구계약하적최우정구량대우비발개계약하적최우정구량.단시,공응련리윤최대시,회구계약여비발개계약하적공응련리윤대소관계칙불학정.차외,본문환토론료동시고필책략형소비자화소비자퇴화적정형.
Some consumers may delay purchases when they anticipate that prices may decrease in the future.They anticipate the probability of markdown,compare the difference of utility between buy now and buy later,and determine the best timing of purchase.This strategic or forward-looking behavior is known as strategic consumer behavior.With increasing number of strategic consumers,their behaviors have attracted increasing attention and need to be considered when designing supply chain contracts.Wholesale price contract and buyback contract are two types of contract that have been discussed widely.However,the questions of （1） whether the buyback contract performs better than wholesale price contract,and （2） how to choose and change a supply chain contract for the retailer and manufacturer,need to be studied with the consideration of strategic consumer behavior.In this paper,we use a framework of rational expectations equilibrium and study the problems of mechanism design and supply chain contract selection with strategic consumers.We first consider a supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer and begin with an analysis of rational expectation problems between the retailer and consumer.We then compare supply chain performance with wholesale price contract and buyback contract and provide principles for designing and selecting the contract.We show in this paper that a buyback contract with strategic consumer behavior can motivate retailers to improve both order quantity and price more than a wholesale price contract.A buyback contract will benefit the retailer more than the supplier with an increase of product valuation,a decrease of wholesale price,and an increase of production cost.A supply chain with buyback contract will have higher optimal order quantity than a supply chain with wholesale price contract when the consumers＇ valuation of product exceeds a threshold.However,a supply chain with buyback contract is not always performing better than a supply chain with wholesale price contract.We also discuss the situations with both strategic consumer behavior and consumer returns.We find that the probability of returns will affect retailer＇s optimal price and optimal quantity.With the increase of the probability of return,the optimal quantity of the retailer with wholesale price contract will decrease whereas the optimal price will increase.With the increase of the probability of return,the optimal quantity of the retailer with buyback contract will also decrease.This implies that the retailer will counteract the disadvantages of returns by restricting supply with either wholesale price contract or buyback contract.We also find that with strategic consumer behavior and consumer returns the optimal quantity of retailer with buyback contract will still be larger than the optimal quantity of retailer with wholesale price contract.The buyback contract will also benefit the retailer more than the supplier.