CAJ | 학술논문

结合交易费用理论，构建了校企合作培养创新型人才的进化博弈模型，讨论了高校和企业最终可能积极合作的四种情形，并对分析了其中的理想情形。研究表明：合作成本和培养成本越低，在合作过程中获得的支持力度越大，高校越容易倾向于积极与企业合作；合作成本、培养成本，以及企业因资助高校而承担的财政压力越低，所培养人才的绩效越显著，企业越倾向于积极与高校合作。
결합교역비용이론，구건료교기합작배양창신형인재적진화박혁모형，토론료고교화기업최종가능적겁합작적사충정형，병대분석료기중적이상정형。연구표명：합작성본화배양성본월저，재합작과정중획득적지지력도월대，고교월용역경향우적겁여기업합작；합작성본、배양성본，이급기업인자조고교이승담적재정압력월저，소배양인재적적효월현저，기업월경향우적겁여고교합작。
Constructs an evolutionary game model of cultivating innovative talents by school-enterprise cooperation based on transaction costs and dynamic game theory ,then discusses the four situations in which universities and companies may actively cooperate eventually ,and analyses the conditions to achieve the ideal one. The study shows that universities prone to cooperate with enterprises to cultivate innovative talents actively with lower innovative talents cultivation costs and transaction costs ,and greater support obtained ,while enterprises prone to cooperate with enterprises to cultivate innovative talents actively with lower innovative talents cultivation costs ,transaction costs and the financial pressure by funding universities ,and more significant performance of innovative talents .