证券市场导报
證券市場導報
증권시장도보
Securities Market Herald
2014年
5期
26~33
,共null页
股权激励计划 行权业绩条件 盈利能力 从众效应
股權激勵計劃 行權業績條件 盈利能力 從衆效應
고권격려계화 행권업적조건 영리능력 종음효응
equity incentive plan, performance-vesting conditions, profitability, herd effect
自2006年以来,我国上市公司推出的股权激励计划都是业绩型股权激励。我们发现,这些股权激励计划的行权业绩条件主要集中在加权平均净资产收益率和净利润增长率两项会计业绩指标上,且对它们所要求的业绩水平分别集中在“10%”和“20%”上,形成了有趣的“10%/20%”现象。本文通过将行权业绩条件与推出股权激励计划公司自身往期、所在行业往期以及推出计划前分析师盈利预测等进行比较后发现,“10%/20%”并非推出股权激励计划公司盈利能力的真实期望和合理反映,而是从众效应之结果。本文还发现,这一从众效应与证监会的股权激励计划备案制及对股权再融资等的长期监管存在一定关联。
自2006年以來,我國上市公司推齣的股權激勵計劃都是業績型股權激勵。我們髮現,這些股權激勵計劃的行權業績條件主要集中在加權平均淨資產收益率和淨利潤增長率兩項會計業績指標上,且對它們所要求的業績水平分彆集中在“10%”和“20%”上,形成瞭有趣的“10%/20%”現象。本文通過將行權業績條件與推齣股權激勵計劃公司自身往期、所在行業往期以及推齣計劃前分析師盈利預測等進行比較後髮現,“10%/20%”併非推齣股權激勵計劃公司盈利能力的真實期望和閤理反映,而是從衆效應之結果。本文還髮現,這一從衆效應與證鑑會的股權激勵計劃備案製及對股權再融資等的長期鑑管存在一定關聯。
자2006년이래,아국상시공사추출적고권격려계화도시업적형고권격려。아문발현,저사고권격려계화적행권업적조건주요집중재가권평균정자산수익솔화정리윤증장솔량항회계업적지표상,차대타문소요구적업적수평분별집중재“10%”화“20%”상,형성료유취적“10%/20%”현상。본문통과장행권업적조건여추출고권격려계화공사자신왕기、소재행업왕기이급추출계화전분석사영리예측등진행비교후발현,“10%/20%”병비추출고권격려계화공사영리능력적진실기망화합리반영,이시종음효응지결과。본문환발현,저일종음효응여증감회적고권격려계화비안제급대고권재융자등적장기감관존재일정관련。
This paper investigates the performance-vesting conditions in the equity incentive plans of China's A-Share listed companies. We find that most plans link vesting to ROE (return on equity) and NIG (growth rate of net income) restrictions, and interestingly, the required level of ROE (NIG) generally is 10% (20%). We compare them with the past performance of the companies and the industries, and the analysts' earnings forecasting, and the results show that there are significant differences between the performance-vesting conditions and the latter. As a result, the "10%/20%" phenomenon arise form herd effect, and the performance-vesting conditions of these plans do not reflect the real profitability of those companies. We also suggest that the phenomenon is related to the Examine-and-Approve system of the CSRC to some extent.