CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型，研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略，并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现，ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量，随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量；随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强，该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低，而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高；若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强，其期望利润会得到提高，反之，则会降低。
통과건립ATO공응련중최종산품제조상여기량개공응상간적토개환개합작모형，연구료ATO공응련적령부건생산보화책략화상응적리윤분배책략，병탐토료공응련중각합작주체의개능력대최우해적영향。연구발현，ATO공응련응수착최종산품소수개격적제고이증가령부건산량，수최종산품조장성본혹령부건생산성본적제고이감소령부건산량；수착최종산품제조상대기중일개공응상의개능력적증강，해공응상령부건적전이개격급기리윤회강저，이령외일개공응상적령부건전이개격화리윤회제고；약최종산품제조상비령외일개공응상적의개능력강，기기망리윤회득도제고，반지，칙회강저。
A bargaining cooperative game model for assemble-to-order （ATO） supply chain composed of a final product manufacturer and two suppliers is proposed to study the component production and replenish- ment policy and the corresponding profit-sharing policy. The effect of participant＇s bargaining power chain on the optimal solution is analyzed. It is found that ATO supply chain should raise the component produc- tion with the rise of the final product price, and reduce it with the rise of assembly cost of finished product or production cost of components. With the improvement of the bargaining power of final product manufac- turer to one supplier, the transfer price of components and profits of this supplier is reduced, while those of another supplier are increased at the same time. The expected profits of the final product manufacturer in- crease if its bargaining power is stronger than another supplier, and otherwise it reduces.