经济经纬
經濟經緯
경제경위
Economic Survey
2014年
3期
108~113
,共null页
经理权力 外部制度环境 产权性质 超额薪酬
經理權力 外部製度環境 產權性質 超額薪酬
경리권력 외부제도배경 산권성질 초액신수
Manager Power; Marketing Process; Property Right; Excessive Compensation
笔者以我国上市公司为研究样本,实证分析在不同产权性质的企业中,市场化进程对于经理权力抑制作用所产生的差异.研究结果表明,经理权力越大,经理所获得的超额薪酬越多;企业所处的外部制度环境能够显著影响经理通过个人权力攫取超额薪酬的能力;外部制度环境对于经理权力的影响在国有企业中表现得更为明显.
筆者以我國上市公司為研究樣本,實證分析在不同產權性質的企業中,市場化進程對于經理權力抑製作用所產生的差異.研究結果錶明,經理權力越大,經理所穫得的超額薪酬越多;企業所處的外部製度環境能夠顯著影響經理通過箇人權力攫取超額薪酬的能力;外部製度環境對于經理權力的影響在國有企業中錶現得更為明顯.
필자이아국상시공사위연구양본,실증분석재불동산권성질적기업중,시장화진정대우경리권력억제작용소산생적차이.연구결과표명,경리권력월대,경리소획득적초액신수월다;기업소처적외부제도배경능구현저영향경리통과개인권력확취초액신수적능력;외부제도배경대우경리권력적영향재국유기업중표현득경위명현.
This paper adopts data of China＇ s A-share listed companies, empirical by tests whether manager power and marketing process can influence manager excessive compensation, as well as enterprises with different property right, the difference inhibition of manager power by marketing process. The research finds out that： first, the greater the manager power, the more the manager compen- sation ; second, marketing process can effectively restrain the effect of manager power on excessive compensation ; third, there is an ob- vious inhibition effect of marketing process on manager power in state-owned enterprises.
