CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立动态博弈模型分析股市摘牌的作用机理，实证研究“ST预警-摘牌”退市体系的市场认可程度。结果发现，虽然退市预警制度在短期内能较好地向市场传达风险信号，但在中长期里给予了投资者投机炒作的空间，这有助于解释为何以往理论研究与市场观察结果相悖；即便我国股市摘牌强度相对较低，但市场能识别摘牌强度的信号并对其做出显著反应，摘牌起到了“杀鸡儆猴”的威慑作用。
통과건립동태박혁모형분석고시적패적작용궤리，실증연구“ST예경-적패”퇴시체계적시장인가정도。결과발현，수연퇴시예경제도재단기내능교호지향시장전체풍험신호，단재중장기리급여료투자자투궤초작적공간，저유조우해석위하이왕이론연구여시장관찰결과상패；즉편아국고시적패강도상대교저，단시장능식별적패강도적신호병대기주출현저반응，적패기도료“살계경후”적위섭작용。
This paper builds a dynamic game model to analyze the mechanism of delisting, and conducts an empirical study on the public acceptance of special treatment and delisting system. The empirical analysis shows that although the special treatment can release the delisting risk in the short term, it encourages speculation in the medium and long term. This can explain the difference between the theoretical research and market watch. Despite the inefficient delisting system, the market can identify the delisting signal and make significant reactions, so delisting can act as a deterrent.