金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2014年
5期
126~142
,共null页
邵新建 贾中正 赵映雪 江萍 薛熠
邵新建 賈中正 趙映雪 江萍 薛熠
소신건 가중정 조영설 강평 설습
借壳上市 内幕交易 ST公司
藉殼上市 內幕交易 ST公司
차각상시 내막교역 ST공사
Reverse merger, Insider trading, ST listed company
本文以sT类公司为样本,研究了借壳上市过程中的内幕交易存在性及其发生机制问题。结果发现:在控制权转让信息正式披露前,sT股票价格和交易量都出现正向异动,并且在停牌前最后交易季度,股东数量相比前季度显著下降,而人均持股比例却显著提高。这意味着在借壳上市过程中普遍存在内幕交易行为。进一步研究发现:证监会针对内幕交易的行政执法越严格,上市公司在敏感信息披露前的停牌越及时,越有助于抑制内幕信息的提前泄露;内幕知情人预期公告复牌后sT股价涨幅越大,内幕交易越严重;相对于国有性质的实际控制人,民营控制人退出sT公司时通过内幕交易寻求补偿的动机更为强烈。
本文以sT類公司為樣本,研究瞭藉殼上市過程中的內幕交易存在性及其髮生機製問題。結果髮現:在控製權轉讓信息正式披露前,sT股票價格和交易量都齣現正嚮異動,併且在停牌前最後交易季度,股東數量相比前季度顯著下降,而人均持股比例卻顯著提高。這意味著在藉殼上市過程中普遍存在內幕交易行為。進一步研究髮現:證鑑會針對內幕交易的行政執法越嚴格,上市公司在敏感信息披露前的停牌越及時,越有助于抑製內幕信息的提前洩露;內幕知情人預期公告複牌後sT股價漲幅越大,內幕交易越嚴重;相對于國有性質的實際控製人,民營控製人退齣sT公司時通過內幕交易尋求補償的動機更為彊烈。
본문이sT류공사위양본,연구료차각상시과정중적내막교역존재성급기발생궤제문제。결과발현:재공제권전양신식정식피로전,sT고표개격화교역량도출현정향이동,병차재정패전최후교역계도,고동수량상비전계도현저하강,이인균지고비례각현저제고。저의미착재차각상시과정중보편존재내막교역행위。진일보연구발현:증감회침대내막교역적행정집법월엄격,상시공사재민감신식피로전적정패월급시,월유조우억제내막신식적제전설로;내막지정인예기공고복패후sT고개창폭월대,내막교역월엄중;상대우국유성질적실제공제인,민영공제인퇴출sT공사시통과내막교역심구보상적동궤경위강렬。
Using the ST listed companies in China as sample, this paper investigates whether insider trading ex- ists in reverse merger as well as its occurrence mechanism. We find that ST stock price and trading volume has begun increasing significantly before the information about control right transfer is disclosed. In addition, the shareholder number in the quarter before suspending trading is much lower than the last quarter, however, the average ownership proportion per shareholder has increased obviously before pausing trading. These results imply that insider trading is pervasive in the reverse merger process. Further studies verify that the strict CSRC en- forcement of law can help suppress illegal insider trading; the earlier ST companies begin to suspend trading be- fore information disclosure, the less is insider trading. However, the more return to ST stock after announcement informed insiders expect, the more is insider trading. Moreover, when the actual controller of ST company is pri- vate enterprise, it has stronger incentive to seek compensation for its transfer of listed company than government as the actual controller.