CAJ | 학술논문

我国的环境规制政策由地方政府负责执行，地方政府的环境规制策略直接影响着整个国家的环境质量状况。由于区域环境污染具有跨界性,在环境规制的执行过程中，地方政府之间存在博弈关系。根据地方政府间环境规制博弈呈现出的长期性和动态性。基于演化博弈理论探讨了地方政府环境规制决策的演化过程。建立了地方政府与地方政府的演化博弈模型。分别研究了未引入约束机制和约束机制下的地方政府环境规制策略及其影响因素，根据复制动态方程得到了地方政府的行为演化规律和演化稳定策略。研究结果表明，地方政府的环境规制策略不会受到政府间外部效应的影响，地方政府的环境规制成本、中央政府对地方政府不执行环境规制行为的处罚力度、政绩考核体系中环境质量指标的权重系数、地方政府执行环境规制的污染排放削减量以及不执行环境规制的污染排放增加量，是影响地方政府环境规制决策的重要因素。在未引入约束机制的情况下，地方政府会通过权衡环境规制收益和环境规制成本进行策略选择，当环境规制净收益为正时,选择执行环境规制的地方政府数量会逐渐增加；当环境规制净收益为负时，选择执行环境规制的地方政府数量会逐渐降低。缺乏约束的地方政府很可能陷入环境规制决策的“囚徒困境”。而约束机制的引入可以引导地方政府的环境规制决策向“帕累托改进”的方向演化，通过降低环境规制成本、加大中央政府对地方政府的处罚力度以及提高政绩考核体系中环境质量指标的权重系数。可以促进地方政府环境规制的高效执行。
아국적배경규제정책유지방정부부책집행，지방정부적배경규제책략직접영향착정개국가적배경질량상황。유우구역배경오염구유과계성,재배경규제적집행과정중，지방정부지간존재박혁관계。근거지방정부간배경규제박혁정현출적장기성화동태성。기우연화박혁이론탐토료지방정부배경규제결책적연화과정。건립료지방정부여지방정부적연화박혁모형。분별연구료미인입약속궤제화약속궤제하적지방정부배경규제책략급기영향인소，근거복제동태방정득도료지방정부적행위연화규률화연화은정책략。연구결과표명，지방정부적배경규제책략불회수도정부간외부효응적영향，지방정부적배경규제성본、중앙정부대지방정부불집행배경규제행위적처벌력도、정적고핵체계중배경질량지표적권중계수、지방정부집행배경규제적오염배방삭감량이급불집행배경규제적오염배방증가량，시영향지방정부배경규제결책적중요인소。재미인입약속궤제적정황하，지방정부회통과권형배경규제수익화배경규제성본진행책략선택，당배경규제정수익위정시,선택집행배경규제적지방정부수량회축점증가；당배경규제정수익위부시，선택집행배경규제적지방정부수량회축점강저。결핍약속적지방정부흔가능함입배경규제결책적“수도곤경”。이약속궤제적인입가이인도지방정부적배경규제결책향“파루탁개진”적방향연화，통과강저배경규제성본、가대중앙정부대지방정부적처벌력도이급제고정적고핵체계중배경질량지표적권중계수。가이촉진지방정부배경규제적고효집행。
The environmental regulation policy is implemented by local governments in China, and the environmental quality of whole nation is directly affected by the environmental regulation strategy of local governments. There is a game relationship between local governments in the process of implementation of environmental regulation for the trans-boundary of regional pollution. The game of environmental regulation between local governments is long-term and dynamic, the evolutionary process of environmental regulation strategy of local governments is discussed based on the evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary game model between local governments is established, the environmental regulation strategy of local governments and related factors without restriction mechanism and under restriction mechanism are studied respectively. Behavioral evolutionary law and evolutionary stable strategy of local governments is given according to replieator dynamics equation. It is showed that, the environmental regulation strategy of local governments will not be affected by the externality between local governments. The environmental regulation strategy of local governments will be significantly affected by the cost of local government environmental regulation, the punishment of central government to local government, the weight coefficient of environmental quality index in achievement assessment system, the emission reduction of implementing environmental regulation and the emission increase of not implementing .environmental regulation. In the condition without restriction mechanism, the local government will choose its strategy by comparing the income and cost of environmental regulation. When the net income of environmental regulation is positive, the number of local governments choosing ＂implement＂ will be increasing. When the net income of environmental regulation is negative, the number of local government choosing ＂implement＂ will be reducing. The local government is likely to fall into the Prisoner＇ s Dilemma of regulation strategy when restriction mechanism is not introduced, and the introduction of the restriction mechanism can lead the environmental regulation strategy of local government to the Pareto improvement. The implementation of local government environmental regulation will be promoted by reducing the cost of local government environmental regulation, strengthening the punishment of central government to local government, increasing the weight coefficient of environmental quality index in achievement assessment system.