CAJ | 학술논문

在随机的市场需求条件下，本文针对风险中性制造商为主导和风险规避零售商为随从的两级供应链，构建了单源渠道和双源渠道情形下供应链Stackelberg博弈模型，对比分析了不同情形下供应链均衡策略的变化。研究结果表明零售商的风险规避只能改变零售渠道的价格，而不会影响制造商批发价格和电子直销价格的制定；电子直销渠道市场份额会影响制造商和零售商决策的制定，减缓零售商的风险规避影响程度，品牌差异策略并不能完全协调渠道间的冲突。
재수궤적시장수구조건하，본문침대풍험중성제조상위주도화풍험규피령수상위수종적량급공응련，구건료단원거도화쌍원거도정형하공응련Stackelberg박혁모형，대비분석료불동정형하공응련균형책략적변화。연구결과표명령수상적풍험규피지능개변령수거도적개격，이불회영향제조상비발개격화전자직소개격적제정；전자직소거도시장빈액회영향제조상화령수상결책적제정，감완령수상적풍험규피영향정도，품패차이책략병불능완전협조거도간적충돌。
In the market demand for the random condition, for a two echelon supply chain attendant with a risk neutral manufacturer as a leader and a risk aversion retailer as a follower, the paper constructs the supply chain Stackelberg model for two cases of single channel and dual channel, and carries out comparative analysis of the change of equilibrium strategies in supply chain under different conditions. The results show that, the retailer＇s risk aversion can only change the price of retail channels, without affecting the making manufacturers wholesale prices and electronic direct selling price; electronic direct channel market share will influence the formulation of manufacturers and retailers decision, and decrease the influence of risk aversion; brand differentiation strategy cann＇t coordinate the inter channel conflict completely.