CAJ | 학술논문

文章基于政府（官员）和民主代理人（人大代表）的“公共决策一民主监督”博弈模型阐述了民主作为普世价值可制约政府公共决策的短期行为，从而延伸出民主代理的独立性、充分性和阶段性假说。经验部分利用来自285个地级市省级人大代表样本，设定了民主代理能力（人大代表的年龄和学历）、民主独立性和民主充分性等指标，实证估计发现民主代理可以提升公共支出倾向于民生领域的结构优化系数Expen以及供需匹配性ρ；随着代理人能力、非官员人大代表比重（即民主独立性）、基层代表相对精英代表比重（即民主的充分性）的提升，政府公共决策更具有福利导向性；且民主代理在落后和市场化程度低的地区存在监督功能缺陷，即验证了民主阶段性假说。
문장기우정부（관원）화민주대리인（인대대표）적“공공결책일민주감독”박혁모형천술료민주작위보세개치가제약정부공공결책적단기행위，종이연신출민주대리적독립성、충분성화계단성가설。경험부분이용래자285개지급시성급인대대표양본，설정료민주대리능력（인대대표적년령화학력）、민주독립성화민주충분성등지표，실증고계발현민주대리가이제승공공지출경향우민생영역적결구우화계수Expen이급공수필배성ρ；수착대리인능력、비관원인대대표비중（즉민주독립성）、기층대표상대정영대표비중（즉민주적충분성）적제승，정부공공결책경구유복리도향성；차민주대리재락후화시장화정도저적지구존재감독공능결함，즉험증료민주계단성가설。
Based on the game model of government officials and democratic agents （ deputies to people＇s congresses）, this article explains how democracy restricts the government＇s short - term behavior of public decision - making. The article thus gives rise to the hypothesis of democratic agency is independent, fully democratic adequacy and develops by stages. The article uses samples from 285 cities to examine the impact of democracy agency on the matching level and finds out that the provinces with higher democratic agency levels can better supply public goods to meet citizens＇ demand, while the provinces with the higher proportion of grassroots representatives show larger scale of public expenditures for people＇s livelihood. The results suggest that media can play its role in promoting the performance of public expenditures. It makes sense to emphasize the value of democratic institutions. In order to enhance the quality of agency, China needs to resolve the problem of distributing deputies＇ seats to regional representatives, urban and rural representatives, industry representatives, and representatives of interest groups, thereby increasing expenditures in the interest of citizens.