CAJ | 학술논문

食品安全信息不对称、不完全和外部性的特征要求政府必须对其进行适宜规制。基于市场主体行为的视角，构建了政府与食品生产企业的博弈模型，对政府食品安全规制决策的影响因素进行了分析。研究发现，政府食品安全规制的决策受两类因素的影响：一方面企业从利益最大化原则出发可能违规生产，需要政府强化规制；另一方面政府须在规制的成本与收益之间权衡，当规制的社会成本过高时选择放弃规制。对此，应从加强规制力度、降低规制的社会成本两方面进一步优化政府食品安全规制政策。
식품안전신식불대칭、불완전화외부성적특정요구정부필수대기진행괄의규제。기우시장주체행위적시각，구건료정부여식품생산기업적박혁모형，대정부식품안전규제결책적영향인소진행료분석。연구발현，정부식품안전규제적결책수량류인소적영향：일방면기업종이익최대화원칙출발가능위규생산，수요정부강화규제；령일방면정부수재규제적성본여수익지간권형，당규제적사회성본과고시선택방기규제。대차，응종가강규제력도、강저규제적사회성본량방면진일보우화정부식품안전규제정책。
It is vital that the government regulate food safety information properly because of the asymmetry,incompleteness and externalities of this information.Based on the micro-behaviors of market main body, this paper constructs a game model of government and food production enterprise to analyze the factors influencing government decisions on food safety regulations.The study finds that of government decisions are affected two types of factors. For one thing, the government should strengthen its regulations as food production enterprises may produce illegally in order to pursue maximum profit;for the other, the government should make a trade off when regulating the costs and benefits and abandon it if the cost exceeds the benefits.Under this circumstance,it is necessary to continue strengthening regulations as well as reduce the regulation cost to optimize the regulation policy.