CAJ | 학술논문

基于不完全信息博弈分析企业技术再创新和政府补偿之间的关系。结果表明：企业技术再创新的期望利润与企业前次技术创新失败资源在再创新中发挥的效用正相关；企业技术再创新的期望利润与企业技术再创新成功概率正相关；企业技术再创新成功概率与企业获得政府补偿的概率正相关，且政府补偿的概率与补偿标准负相关；政府的期望社会福利和企业技术再创新带来的社会增量福利正相关；企业和政府可依据技术再创新成功概率分别做出是否技术再创新和补偿的决策。
기우불완전신식박혁분석기업기술재창신화정부보상지간적관계。결과표명：기업기술재창신적기망리윤여기업전차기술창신실패자원재재창신중발휘적효용정상관；기업기술재창신적기망리윤여기업기술재창신성공개솔정상관；기업기술재창신성공개솔여기업획득정부보상적개솔정상관，차정부보상적개솔여보상표준부상관；정부적기망사회복리화기업기술재창신대래적사회증량복리정상관；기업화정부가의거기술재창신성공개솔분별주출시부기술재창신화보상적결책。
This paper is based on incomplete information game analysis of the relationship between enterprise technology re-innovation and government compensation. The results showed that： enterprise technology re-innovation expected profit has apositively related to the resources which are accumulated in the previous innovation failure utility to play in the technologyre-innovation; enterprise technology re-innovation expected profit has a positively related to the probability of enterprisetechnology re-innovation success; the probability of enterprise technology re-innovation success and enterprises obtain gov-ernment compensation of probability positively related ; the probability of government compensation is negatively correlated tothe compensation standard; government expected social welfare has a positively related to the incremental social welfarewhich is brought by enterprise technology re-innovation ; based on the probability of enterprise technology re-innovation suc-cess enterprises make a decision on whether re-innovation and the government make a decision about whether compensates onthe previous failed innovations.