CAJ | 학술논문

分税制改革强化了中央财政集权，各部委掌握的资源越来越多，地方与部委的政治关联强度会显著影响其获得的财政转移支付。本文基于2003年部长更换的自然实验，利用倍差法研究了部长的政治关联的影响，研究发现：（1）新任部长的政治关联效应会使其来源地的地级市获得的专项转移支付增加2亿元，如果是重要部委的部长，该效应上升至9．4亿元，相当于在原有水平上增加130％；（2）政治关联效应在部长的一个任期之内是非线性的，呈现先上升后下降的“倒U型”的趋势；（3）增加政治关联和减少政治关联的效应是非对称的，部长卸任并没有伴随着专项转移支付的显著减少；（4）政治关联效应仅体现在正部长，副部长对其来源地获得的财政资源影响不大。
분세제개혁강화료중앙재정집권，각부위장악적자원월래월다，지방여부위적정치관련강도회현저영향기획득적재정전이지부。본문기우2003년부장경환적자연실험，이용배차법연구료부장적정치관련적영향，연구발현：（1）신임부장적정치관련효응회사기래원지적지급시획득적전항전이지부증가2억원，여과시중요부위적부장，해효응상승지9．4억원，상당우재원유수평상증가130％；（2）정치관련효응재부장적일개임기지내시비선성적，정현선상승후하강적“도U형”적추세；（3）증가정치관련화감소정치관련적효응시비대칭적，부장사임병몰유반수착전항전이지부적현저감소；（4）정치관련효응부체현재정부장，부부장대기래원지획득적재정자원영향불대。
The political connection between local governments and ministries can significantly affect the fiscal transfer from the central government. Based on a natural experiment of ministers＇ reappointment in 2003, this paper studies the influence of ministers＇ political connection, to his birthplace, on the allocation of earmarked grants using Difference-in-difference identification. We find a newly appointed minister makes the earmarked grants of his prefecture increase 200 million. If it is an important ministry, this effect increases up to 940 million, equals to an increase of 130%. We also find the effect of political connection is nonlinear, which presents a reversed U-shape. The effect of increased and decreased political connection is unsymmetrical. The deputy ministers have little effect on the allocation of grants.