CAJ | 학술논문

本文利用以“社会价格”为基础的两方搜寻匹配模型分析婚姻市场均衡条件及价格扭曲导致的失衡。在行为主体理性、价格信号准确的婚姻市场，将形成“顺序的”均衡结果，即同等级、同类别男女结合的“同型婚配”；但是主体对自身及对象价格估计的偏差，都将导致市场失衡。一方面，自我高估导致本应匹配的男女无法顺利结合，自我低估则使人仓促迈入并不合适的婚姻，此外，两者均有消极外部影响——将条件最差的男人（女人）驱逐出婚恋市场、使其无法找到婚配对象。另一方面，“社会价格”信号可能发生故意或无意的扭曲，造成对他人真实价值的错误估计以及随之而来的恋爱选择偏差；但是这类价格扭曲将随着相处时间的增加、双方信息的对称化而逐步得到修正。
본문이용이“사회개격”위기출적량방수심필배모형분석혼인시장균형조건급개격뉴곡도치적실형。재행위주체이성、개격신호준학적혼인시장，장형성“순서적”균형결과，즉동등급、동유별남녀결합적“동형혼배”；단시주체대자신급대상개격고계적편차，도장도치시장실형。일방면，자아고고도치본응필배적남녀무법순리결합，자아저고칙사인창촉매입병불합괄적혼인，차외，량자균유소겁외부영향——장조건최차적남인（녀인）구축출혼련시장、사기무법조도혼배대상。령일방면，“사회개격”신호가능발생고의혹무의적뉴곡，조성대타인진실개치적착오고계이급수지이래적연애선택편차；단시저류개격뉴곡장수착상처시간적증가、쌍방신식적대칭화이축보득도수정。
This paper examines the equilibrium and disequilibrium in the marriage market by using a two - sided search model based on the theory of social price. When all agents are rational and price signal is not distorted, the market reaches the perfect sorting homogamy equilibrium, in which agents with similar types and categories marry within their groups. But misestimations for both oneself and others lead to disequilibrium. On the one hand, over - self - estimated individuals turn down matches of the same type. Under - self - estimated people end up in unfit marriages at an earlier time. Both kinds of inaccurate self - evaluation have the negative externality which prevents the low - type men/ women from marrying. On the other hand, the displayed social price may be distorted from the actual social price of an individual either on purpose or indeliberately, leading to the absence of marital market clearing. However, the misrepresented price will be gradually corrected as the time spent together increases and information asymmetry fades away.