CAJ | 학술논문

在农户信贷融资过程中存在农户和农村金融机构两类主体，本文运用演化博弈理论及方法，构建农户和农村金融机构的信贷关系演化博弈模型，分析博弈双方的复制动态方程及动态进化过程。研究表明，农户与农村金融机构演化的长期均衡结果与双方博弈的支付矩阵及初始状态有关，合作产生的额外收益、交易成本是影响农户和农村金融机构信贷关系演变结果的关键因素。进一步发现，在目前的农村市场环境下，农户信贷融资演化博弈结果收敛于博弈双方选择“不合作”策略的概率增加，即农户信贷融资困难。基于相关参数变动对演化结果的影响，通过调节相关参数优化农户信贷融资演化的路径，使系统向双方“合作”模式发展，促进农村金融服务的发展。
재농호신대융자과정중존재농호화농촌금융궤구량류주체，본문운용연화박혁이론급방법，구건농호화농촌금융궤구적신대관계연화박혁모형，분석박혁쌍방적복제동태방정급동태진화과정。연구표명，농호여농촌금융궤구연화적장기균형결과여쌍방박혁적지부구진급초시상태유관，합작산생적액외수익、교역성본시영향농호화농촌금융궤구신대관계연변결과적관건인소。진일보발현，재목전적농촌시장배경하，농호신대융자연화박혁결과수렴우박혁쌍방선택“불합작”책략적개솔증가，즉농호신대융자곤난。기우상관삼수변동대연화결과적영향，통과조절상관삼수우화농호신대융자연화적로경，사계통향쌍방“합작”모식발전，촉진농촌금융복무적발전。
Farmers and rural financial institutions are two major parties involved in farmers＇ credit financing. This paper built an evolutionary game model of the above two parties based on evolutionary game theory and analyzed evolution of dynamic behavior of both players. Study had shown that, long-term equilibrium was related to the pay off matrix and the initial state of both players of the game, and the additional revenue generated by cooperation and transaction costs was a key factor affecting the results of the evolution. In the current environment of rural financial markets, it was growingly possible that results of this evolutionary game converge on ＂uncooperative-uncooperative＂ strategy of both players, which meant that the farmers were faced with credit financing difficulties. This paper had adjusted parameters to optimize the evolution path of credit financing of farmers on the basis of impact on changes in relevant parameters on evolution of outcome, thus making the model develop towards ＂cooperative-cooperative ＂strategy of both players and pro- moting the development of rural financial services.