CAJ | 학술논문

本文建立一个一般均衡模型刻画了中国地方政府出让土地、投资基础设施和主导经济增长的行为。模型发现，在政治集权和经济分权的体制下，中国地方政府官员为了追逐政治晋升收益与私人经济收益．会利用土地处置权，在垄断的土地市场上策略性地设定土地出让价格与土地出让规模，进而利用土地出让收入与相关税收收入，投资公共基础设施以推动经济增长与获取财政收入。地方政府官员的晋升动机越强、向中央发送能力信号的效率越高、提供基础设施的效率越高、受到的监管越严格、地方政府税收留存比例越高、土地原始征用价格越低，则地方政府官员倾向于出让更多的土地、提供更多的公共基础设施．实现更高的经济产出。各种经济与政治因素在影响最终产出水平的同时，也影响了地方政府税收收入、地方政府土地出让收入、居民收入以及地方政府官员私人经济收入．改变了整个经济的收入分配格局。
본문건립일개일반균형모형각화료중국지방정부출양토지、투자기출설시화주도경제증장적행위。모형발현，재정치집권화경제분권적체제하，중국지방정부관원위료추축정치진승수익여사인경제수익．회이용토지처치권，재롱단적토지시장상책략성지설정토지출양개격여토지출양규모，진이이용토지출양수입여상관세수수입，투자공공기출설시이추동경제증장여획취재정수입。지방정부관원적진승동궤월강、향중앙발송능력신호적효솔월고、제공기출설시적효솔월고、수도적감관월엄격、지방정부세수류존비례월고、토지원시정용개격월저，칙지방정부관원경향우출양경다적토지、제공경다적공공기출설시．실현경고적경제산출。각충경제여정치인소재영향최종산출수평적동시，야영향료지방정부세수수입、지방정부토지출양수입、거민수입이급지방정부관원사인경제수입．개변료정개경제적수입분배격국。
This paper constructs a general equilibrium model to characterize＇ how local officials lease land, invest in infrastructure and promote economic growth. To achieve career promotion and economic benefits, local officials exploit the land disposal powers, set price and lease land strategically in the monopolistic land market, and get value-added benefits, and then use the income to provide infrastructure to promote economic growth and to meet their own economic interests. The stronger of local officials promotion motivation, the higher efficiency of officials＇ ability to send signals to the central government, the higher efficiency of the provision of public infrastructure, the more stringent supervision officials subject to, the higher proportion of local government revenue retention, the lower land expropriation price, then government officials tend to lease more land and provide more public infrastructure, achieve higher levels of economic output. Various economic and political factors also profoundly influence local government tax revenues, local government land leasing revenue, resident income and local government officials＇ private income.