中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2014年
7期
122~134
,共null页
转售价格控制 实施动因 规制对象 规制路径
轉售價格控製 實施動因 規製對象 規製路徑
전수개격공제 실시동인 규제대상 규제로경
resale price maintenance; implemented motivation; regulated objects; general regulated path
作为一种纵向控制手段,转售价格控制(RPM)被制造商频繁使用,成为颇具争议的纵向约束手段。近期合生元等九家乳粉企业在中国的价格垄断案件.更是把RPM推到风口浪尖。本文尝试对上游制造商RPM策略的实施动因进行理论解析:并以国内外反垄断规制案件判决的实践基准,讨论RPM策略的规制对象与规制路径。研究表明:在上游制造商合谋的情形下,RPM会导致较高的零售价,在排他性策略下,RPM则会降低零售价;因而合谋策略下的制造商RPM行为需要被规制;不过。部分合谋情形下的规制对象是参与合谋的制造商和零售商.主动全面合谋的规制对象是价格领导型制造商.制度约束下的被动全面合谋的规制对象则是制度本身。进一步地,本文针对上游制造商的合作策略与非合作策略.依据RPM实施动因和规制对象的不同,将RPM的规制路径分别解析为惩戒式规制路径、焦点式规制路径和豁免式规制路径。
作為一種縱嚮控製手段,轉售價格控製(RPM)被製造商頻繁使用,成為頗具爭議的縱嚮約束手段。近期閤生元等九傢乳粉企業在中國的價格壟斷案件.更是把RPM推到風口浪尖。本文嘗試對上遊製造商RPM策略的實施動因進行理論解析:併以國內外反壟斷規製案件判決的實踐基準,討論RPM策略的規製對象與規製路徑。研究錶明:在上遊製造商閤謀的情形下,RPM會導緻較高的零售價,在排他性策略下,RPM則會降低零售價;因而閤謀策略下的製造商RPM行為需要被規製;不過。部分閤謀情形下的規製對象是參與閤謀的製造商和零售商.主動全麵閤謀的規製對象是價格領導型製造商.製度約束下的被動全麵閤謀的規製對象則是製度本身。進一步地,本文針對上遊製造商的閤作策略與非閤作策略.依據RPM實施動因和規製對象的不同,將RPM的規製路徑分彆解析為懲戒式規製路徑、焦點式規製路徑和豁免式規製路徑。
작위일충종향공제수단,전수개격공제(RPM)피제조상빈번사용,성위파구쟁의적종향약속수단。근기합생원등구가유분기업재중국적개격롱단안건.경시파RPM추도풍구랑첨。본문상시대상유제조상RPM책략적실시동인진행이론해석:병이국내외반롱단규제안건판결적실천기준,토론RPM책략적규제대상여규제로경。연구표명:재상유제조상합모적정형하,RPM회도치교고적령수개,재배타성책략하,RPM칙회강저령수개;인이합모책략하적제조상RPM행위수요피규제;불과。부분합모정형하적규제대상시삼여합모적제조상화령수상.주동전면합모적규제대상시개격령도형제조상.제도약속하적피동전면합모적규제대상칙시제도본신。진일보지,본문침대상유제조상적합작책략여비합작책략.의거RPM실시동인화규제대상적불동,장RPM적규제로경분별해석위징계식규제로경、초점식규제로경화활면식규제로경。
As a kind of vertical controlling tool, resale price maintenance (RPM) is frequently used by manufacturers and becomes the one of the most controversy vertical restraints. In China, the recent antitrust case that nine powdered milk manufacturers including biostime controlled retail price of powdered milk product through the RPM arrangements between producers and retailers, left RPM the place where the wind and waves are highest alone. This paper explores the regulated factors of RPM strategy, combining the theory with the practices, and then analyses the regulated objects of RPM strategy, regarding the antitrust and regulation cases for RPM as an criteria. We find that RPM could facilitate manufacturers cartelizing, which leads to higher retail price, in contrast, as a tool of exclusion, RPM lowers retail price, therefore, finns' RPM behavior under the case of collusion should be regulated. In the case of the part-collusion, the regulated objects are manufacturers participating collusion and the retailers participating collusion. The regulated objects of initiative collusion of all are price-leading manufacturers, however, that of system-constraint collusion of all is the relevant RPM antitrust-immunity mechanism. Further, in view of the upstream manufacturers implanting RPM strategy, this study divides the regulated path of RPM into punitive-regulated path, regulated-focal path and immune-regulated path, according to the different implementing factors and the different regulated objects for RPM.