科技和产业
科技和產業
과기화산업
SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL
2014年
6期
1~4
,共null页
食品安全 委托—代理 信息对称 合谋行为
食品安全 委託—代理 信息對稱 閤謀行為
식품안전 위탁—대리 신식대칭 합모행위
food safety; principal-agent ; asymmetric information; collusive behavior
在食品安全规制中,地方政府为自身利益最大化,可能与当地食品企业合谋,从而导致规制无效.基于此,文章从非对称信息的角度,运用委托—代理模型分析了食品安全规制中中央政府与地方政府的委托代理关系以及地方政府与食品企业发生合谋的条件,并通过模型研究得出了中央政府加大查处食品安全事故的概率、加大对食品企业和地方政府合谋行为的惩罚,能够显著提高食品安全规制效果的结论.并提出相应的优化我国食品安全规制的对策.
在食品安全規製中,地方政府為自身利益最大化,可能與噹地食品企業閤謀,從而導緻規製無效.基于此,文章從非對稱信息的角度,運用委託—代理模型分析瞭食品安全規製中中央政府與地方政府的委託代理關繫以及地方政府與食品企業髮生閤謀的條件,併通過模型研究得齣瞭中央政府加大查處食品安全事故的概率、加大對食品企業和地方政府閤謀行為的懲罰,能夠顯著提高食品安全規製效果的結論.併提齣相應的優化我國食品安全規製的對策.
재식품안전규제중,지방정부위자신이익최대화,가능여당지식품기업합모,종이도치규제무효.기우차,문장종비대칭신식적각도,운용위탁—대리모형분석료식품안전규제중중앙정부여지방정부적위탁대리관계이급지방정부여식품기업발생합모적조건,병통과모형연구득출료중앙정부가대사처식품안전사고적개솔、가대대식품기업화지방정부합모행위적징벌,능구현저제고식품안전규제효과적결론.병제출상응적우화아국식품안전규제적대책.
In the food safety regulation, the local governments tend to conspire with the local food enterprises in order to pursue their own interests to maximum, which leads to the invalid of food safety regulation. Based on this, the article analyzed the principal-agent relationship between the central government and local governments as well as the conditions that the collusion between local governments and food companies occurs in the food safety regulation using the principal-agent model from the perspective of asymmetric information. By model analysis, we obtained the conclusion that the increase of probability to investigate the food safety incidents and punishment of collusion between the local governments and food enterprises for the central government can significantly improve the effectiveness of food safety regulation. Furthermore, the corresponding measures to optimize the China＇s food safety regulation have been put forward.
