CAJ | 학술논문

在金融集聚区建设中，中央政府行为与地方政府行为表现出行为生态学特征。构建演化博弈模型分析了中央政府和地方政府之间的博弈，显示双方期望收益、中央政府出台政策的力度、地方政府在中央政府不支持情况下建设金融集聚区遭受的损失程度及双方初始博弈策略选择状态决定了演化稳定均衡策略。基于此，提出了因地制宜改变博弈参数、提高地方政府对正向激励和行政惩罚措施的敏感度、构建更加合理的政绩考核体系等建议。
재금융집취구건설중，중앙정부행위여지방정부행위표현출행위생태학특정。구건연화박혁모형분석료중앙정부화지방정부지간적박혁，현시쌍방기망수익、중앙정부출태정책적력도、지방정부재중앙정부불지지정황하건설금융집취구조수적손실정도급쌍방초시박혁책략선택상태결정료연화은정균형책략。기우차，제출료인지제의개변박혁삼수、제고지방정부대정향격려화행정징벌조시적민감도、구건경가합리적정적고핵체계등건의。
In financial industry gathering area construction, central government behavior and local government behavior exhibit behavioral ecology characteristics. The article analyzes gambling relations between central govern- ment and local government by building the model of the evolutionary game theory. The results show that the evolu- tionarily stable equilibrium between central government behavior and local government behavior is determined by the expected return of the two sides, the intensity of the central government policies, the extent of the loss suffered by the local government in the case of no support of central government and the initial state of the strategies selected by the players. Based on the above conclusions, the article makes the following suggestions that changing game parameters pertinently, improving local goverument＇s sensitivity to positive incentives and administrative punitive measures, improving local government performance evaluation mechanism.