生态经济
生態經濟
생태경제
Ecological Economy
2014年
8期
95~100
,共null页
黄泽慧 史小宁 巫景飞 胡昊 赵劲松
黃澤慧 史小寧 巫景飛 鬍昊 趙勁鬆
황택혜 사소저 무경비 호호 조경송
碳交易机制 碳排放配额 碳商 重复博弈
碳交易機製 碳排放配額 碳商 重複博弈
탄교역궤제 탄배방배액 탄상 중복박혁
emissions trading scheme; emissions quota; quota sellers; iterated game theory
随着全球温室效应加剧,低碳经济发展模式受到普遍关注。碳交易机制作为低碳经济下新兴减排措施,近年来得到快速发展。碳交易机制的广泛实施,使得碳交易市场也因此成为部分减排成本较低企业的新的利润来源点。文章依托碳交易市场提供的经济环境,基于非合作博弈理论,建立碳交易市场上碳排放配额供给企业(碳商)之间的重复博弈模型,并结合“针锋相对”策略和惩罚策略,研究发现在资金贴现率发生变化的情况下,碳商可以通过调整惩罚碳排放配额供给量,防止合作方出现单阶段偏离,确保实现长期合作。根据建立的模型,设计计算程序,得到了碳商在长期合作策略下的纳什均衡碳排放配额量和获得的收益。
隨著全毬溫室效應加劇,低碳經濟髮展模式受到普遍關註。碳交易機製作為低碳經濟下新興減排措施,近年來得到快速髮展。碳交易機製的廣汎實施,使得碳交易市場也因此成為部分減排成本較低企業的新的利潤來源點。文章依託碳交易市場提供的經濟環境,基于非閤作博弈理論,建立碳交易市場上碳排放配額供給企業(碳商)之間的重複博弈模型,併結閤“針鋒相對”策略和懲罰策略,研究髮現在資金貼現率髮生變化的情況下,碳商可以通過調整懲罰碳排放配額供給量,防止閤作方齣現單階段偏離,確保實現長期閤作。根據建立的模型,設計計算程序,得到瞭碳商在長期閤作策略下的納什均衡碳排放配額量和穫得的收益。
수착전구온실효응가극,저탄경제발전모식수도보편관주。탄교역궤제작위저탄경제하신흥감배조시,근년래득도쾌속발전。탄교역궤제적엄범실시,사득탄교역시장야인차성위부분감배성본교저기업적신적리윤래원점。문장의탁탄교역시장제공적경제배경,기우비합작박혁이론,건립탄교역시장상탄배방배액공급기업(탄상)지간적중복박혁모형,병결합“침봉상대”책략화징벌책략,연구발현재자금첩현솔발생변화적정황하,탄상가이통과조정징벌탄배방배액공급량,방지합작방출현단계단편리,학보실현장기합작。근거건립적모형,설계계산정서,득도료탄상재장기합작책략하적납십균형탄배방배액량화획득적수익。
Low carbon economy draws increasing attentions from the whole world wtih the significant change in global climate recently. Under the circumstance of low carbon economy, emissions trading scheme as a new emissions reduction measure has a great development in these years. Correspondingly, emissions quota trading market has become a new benefit resource for companies whose emissions reduction costs are low, which are called emissions quota sellers. This paper considers the opportunity for emissions quota sellers provided by the new market and bases on no cooperative game theory to establish an iterated cooperation model between two emissions quota sellers. In addition, this paper combines "Tit-for-Tat" strategy and "Carrot-and-Stick" strategy, finding out when discount factor fluctuates, one emissions quota seller in the game can adjust its penalty supply to avoid paper designs a general program to figure out the Nash they take long-term cooperation strategies. deviation of the other one. Furthermore, based on the model, this equilibrium supplies and payoffs of emissions quota sellers when