CAJ | 학술논문

后税费时代，基于“不出事”的逻辑，各种资源类型的村庄都趋向于低水平均衡式的治理。低水平均衡的土地分利秩序中，基层政府、村干部、灰黑势力结成“地利共同体”，村民与“地利共同体”之间彼此离散，且村民与村民之间也彼此离散。征地中，“地利共同体”倾向在内部完成主要的土地增值利益分配，基层政府和村干部有意减少与村民的接触，尽量不把村民动员起来协商和讨论。如此暂时表面上没有矛盾，但村庄治理能力却在不断下降，且矛盾持续累积，这为以后更多矛盾的爆发埋下伏笔。
후세비시대，기우“불출사”적라집，각충자원류형적촌장도추향우저수평균형식적치리。저수평균형적토지분리질서중，기층정부、촌간부、회흑세력결성“지리공동체”，촌민여“지리공동체”지간피차리산，차촌민여촌민지간야피차리산。정지중，“지리공동체”경향재내부완성주요적토지증치이익분배，기층정부화촌간부유의감소여촌민적접촉，진량불파촌민동원기래협상화토론。여차잠시표면상몰유모순，단촌장치리능력각재불단하강，차모순지속루적，저위이후경다모순적폭발매하복필。
Based on the non-accident logic, the all sorts of resource types of village tend to be the low-level equilibrium ofgovernance in the post-era of tax and fee reform. The low-level equilibrium of distributional structure of land profits madethe local government, village cadres and gangland united into the ＂land-profits community＂ which isolated from local villag-ers. During the land-acquisition process, this so called ＂ land-profits community＂ tended to distributed the most of landprofits in their own community. The local government and village cadres reduced the contact frequency with villagers. Theywere not willing to mobilized villagers toeonsulte and discuss the related issues. Although there was temporarily no conflict,the village governance ablity was falling, and the contradiction was accumulating. Problems above would result in the brea-kout of more contradictions in the future.