CAJ | 학술논문

过度的金融创新经由多重渠道引致和强化了忽略风险、复杂风险等新型风险形态，加剧了金融体系的脆弱性。文章应用全球银行数据库研究发现，金融创新与监管从业务匹配、周期协同性和风险承担激励等方面存在着结构性错配问题。以资本充足为核心的监管强度呈现出典型的顺周期性，危机前的宽松监管与之后的严厉监管未能起到周期平滑效果；混业与综合经营方面则表现为业务监管错配，组织架构上的重复监管与监管真空并存；从激励上看，监管未能有效抑制商业银行的风险承担行为。文章进而从金融制度供给与需求的非对称性角度对二者错配的制度根源进行探讨，并据此提出对策建议。
과도적금융창신경유다중거도인치화강화료홀략풍험、복잡풍험등신형풍험형태，가극료금융체계적취약성。문장응용전구은행수거고연구발현，금융창신여감관종업무필배、주기협동성화풍험승담격려등방면존재착결구성착배문제。이자본충족위핵심적감관강도정현출전형적순주기성，위궤전적관송감관여지후적엄려감관미능기도주기평활효과；혼업여종합경영방면칙표현위업무감관착배，조직가구상적중복감관여감관진공병존；종격려상간，감관미능유효억제상업은행적풍험승담행위。문장진이종금융제도공급여수구적비대칭성각도대이자착배적제도근원진행탐토，병거차제출대책건의。
Excess financial innovation through multiple channels could lead to new risk forms like the neglect of risks and complex risk, intensifying the vulnerability of financial system. Based on global bank database, this paper confirms the structural mismatch between financial innova tion and supervision in aspects such as business matching, cycle synergy and risktaking incen tives. Supervision strength taking capital adequacy as the core is featured by typical procyclicality and relaxed and stringent supervision before and after the crisis respectively do not play the cycle smoothing role; in aspect of mixed and consolidated business, there exists business supervision mismatch, namely coexisting of repeated supervision and supervision vacuum. As for incentives, supervision cannot effectively inhibit risktaking behavior of commercial banks. Furthermore, it discusses the institutional origin of structural mismatch from the perspective of supply and de mand of financial system and accordingly puts forward countermeasures.