CAJ | 학술논문

基于上市公司2005年至2010年的历史数据，本文首次利用银行贷款公告反应来检验不同的货币政策如何影响银行信贷对企业的监督作用。我们的主要发现有：第一，相对于银根宽松阶段，银根紧缩时贷款公告的异常收益率为负且显著更低，表明在银根紧缩时银行的信贷决策并非主要服从于经济目标，导致银行通过信贷发挥的监督作用更差；第二，相对于非国有企业，国有企业在银根紧缩时贷款公告的异常收益率为负且显著更低，意味着在银根紧缩时银行信贷资源会倾向于国有企业，以至于对国有企业的监督作用更弱。
기우상시공사2005년지2010년적역사수거，본문수차이용은행대관공고반응래검험불동적화폐정책여하영향은행신대대기업적감독작용。아문적주요발현유：제일，상대우은근관송계단，은근긴축시대관공고적이상수익솔위부차현저경저，표명재은근긴축시은행적신대결책병비주요복종우경제목표，도치은행통과신대발휘적감독작용경차；제이，상대우비국유기업，국유기업재은근긴축시대관공고적이상수익솔위부차현저경저，의미착재은근긴축시은행신대자원회경향우국유기업，이지우대국유기업적감독작용경약。
Based on the history data of listed firms from 2005 to 2010, we investigate how monetary policies impact the monitoring effects of commercial banks via credit loan. We got a series of empirical results by takingadvantage of the event study method. First, compared to the easy money stage, the abnormal return of loan announcements under tight money stage are significantly lower, which means that the credit resources are notmainly aiming at economic efficiency, and hence lead to worse monitoring effect. Second, under the period oftight money, the state - owned firm＇s loan announcements generate ＂significantly lower abnormal return, whichmeans that under tight money stage, the credit fund is more likely allocated to state - owned enterprises andhence further played down the monitoring effect.