CAJ | 학술논문

政府补贴与企业技术创新之间的不确定关系是补贴政策制定和研究的热点问题，本文在内生性沉没成本理论的框架下，构建企业研发模型，分析不同的政府补贴模式对企业创新产出的激励效果。研究发现，政府补贴对企业的创新激励会受到补贴的持续性与否和企业研发性沉没成本的影响，不同的补贴模式会改变企业预期，从而影响补贴的效果。本文使用153家公司2007—2012年的平行面板数据，采用自体抽样法检验了政府补贴对具有不同研发性沉没成本企业创新产出的激励效果，发现了显著的组间差异。实证结果表明，在战略性新兴产业中，临时性政府补贴模式对企业创新总产出有显著积极影响。在考虑到企业差异的情况下，研发性沉没成本低的企业，政府补贴与企业创新产出之间的正相关系数为0．8305，而研发性沉没成本高的企业，由于受到盈利目标的限制，企业在竞争压力下研发积极性会下降，政府补贴的效果不显著。
정부보첩여기업기술창신지간적불학정관계시보첩정책제정화연구적열점문제，본문재내생성침몰성본이론적광가하，구건기업연발모형，분석불동적정부보첩모식대기업창신산출적격려효과。연구발현，정부보첩대기업적창신격려회수도보첩적지속성여부화기업연발성침몰성본적영향，불동적보첩모식회개변기업예기，종이영향보첩적효과。본문사용153가공사2007—2012년적평행면판수거，채용자체추양법검험료정부보첩대구유불동연발성침몰성본기업창신산출적격려효과，발현료현저적조간차이。실증결과표명，재전략성신흥산업중，림시성정부보첩모식대기업창신총산출유현저적겁영향。재고필도기업차이적정황하，연발성침몰성본저적기업，정부보첩여기업창신산출지간적정상관계수위0．8305，이연발성침몰성본고적기업，유우수도영리목표적한제，기업재경쟁압력하연발적겁성회하강，정부보첩적효과불현저。
It was the hot issue of subsidies policy and research, that the uncertainty relationship between gov ernment subsidies and enterprise technology innovation. To encourage innovation in the strategic emerging indus tries, the financial departments played an active role to support. The article built the enterprise innovation model un der the endogenous sunk costs theory, in order to research the effect of different subsidy modes to the enterprise in novations. The research found the incentive effect to the enterprises was in the influence of the duration of subsidies and the R＆D suck costs. The subsidy modes would change the expectation of the enterprises, and influenced the effect of the subsidy. The article used the balance panel data from 2007 to 2012, employed Bootstrap test to examine the effects for the companies with different R＆D suck costs by the subsidies ,found that the differences were statisti cally significant. The study showed that the subsidies would change the expected profits of the enterprises, so did the market structure, because that more entrants would be attracted by high profits. When the subsidies were permanent, al though the improvement of expected profits would stimulate the enterprises to innovate, the increasing entrants would change the market structure and the competition environment. This would cause low level and excessive competition in products and price rather than high level in innovation, and the subsidy was the key factor led to excess capacity. This article empirically examines this argument using the data of Chinese listed companies in the strategic e merging industries; found that the temporary subsidies would increase the enterprises＇ innovation outputs significant ly. This result means the subsidy implemented in the strategic emerging industries was effective in promoting enter prise innovation and industrial technology level. The subsidies with time limit would control the number of the en trants, which protected the innovative incumbents from the market impact, at the same time, the temporary subsidies would avoid the excessive dependence on government, and the bad consequence of reducing the innovation activity and core competence. After classifying the enterprises by R＆D suck costs, the temporary subsidies would make positive impact on in novation outputs significantly. For the enterprises with lower R＆D suck costs, considering the differences in the en terprises, the positive correlation coefficient between the subsidies and the innovation was 0. 8305 ; but for the enter prises with higher R＆D suck costs, restricted by the profit target, the enterprises would be negative for innovation, and the effect of the subsidies was not significant. This research also examines by classifying the patterns of the in novation outputs,invention patent, utility model patent and design patent, found that the subsidies increased the in vention patents and utility model patents, except the design patent. This means the subsidies were indeed used effec tively, but not the fake innovation. According to the research, the temporary subsidy is suggested to substitute for the permanent subsidy, for the government on the issue of the subsidy mode, which will be helpful to set up the innovation mechanism and to en hance the effect of subsidies. This article believes that the market is the most efficient way to decide which enter prise is the proper subsidy object. Although the object should be selected by some screening conditions, the govern ment could never make the perfect policy to include all conditions. In new product development direction, allocation of resources, using of R＆D funds, evaluation of project, assessment and application of research results, and other fields, how to use the market mechanism is still the research direction for the government and the scholars.