CAJ | 학술논문

在现代市场经济条件尤其是转型经济环境下,传统的代理理论在研究股东与经理人之间关系时由于忽略了经理在公司治理中具有管理防御行为,而使得公司治理绩效、企业融资方式等陷入理论与实践的脱节。实践证明,对经理人管理防御进行研究,不仅能有效提高公司治理效率,而且对新资本结构理论解释中国上市公司的融资偏好也是一种有效的补充。因此,需要增强以公司董事会为主的内部监督,建立并完善职业经理人市场,强化公司负债治理功能,制定合理的经理股权激励,建立适度的股权制衡,建立对经理人管理防御动机的管理体系。
재현대시장경제조건우기시전형경제배경하,전통적대리이론재연구고동여경리인지간관계시유우홀략료경리재공사치리중구유관리방어행위,이사득공사치리적효、기업융자방식등함입이론여실천적탈절。실천증명,대경리인관리방어진행연구,불부능유효제고공사치리효솔,이차대신자본결구이론해석중국상시공사적융자편호야시일충유효적보충。인차,수요증강이공사동사회위주적내부감독,건립병완선직업경리인시장,강화공사부채치리공능,제정합리적경리고권격려,건립괄도적고권제형,건립대경리인관리방어동궤적관리체계。
Under the condition of modem market economy, especially the transition environment of China, the corporate performance, corporate financing and other aspects are in the disconnection between theory and practice duing to ignoring the manager has the managerial entrenchment behavior of defense in the corporate governance when studying the relationship between shareholders and managers using the traditional agency the ory. The practice also proved that, research on the managerial entrenchment, not only can effectively improve the efficiency of corporate governance, but also is an effective supplement for the new capital structure theory to explain China＇ s listing Corporation financing preference. In order to strengthen and establish the managerial entrenchment moving machine management system, we should enhance the board of directors of the company of internal supervision, establish and improve the occupation manager market, strengthen the corporate debt governance function, establish reasonable manager equity incentive and proper ownership balance etc.