财贸经济
財貿經濟
재무경제
Finance & Trade Economics
2014年
9期
62~71
,共null页
财政补贴 风险识别 银行信贷 债务成本
財政補貼 風險識彆 銀行信貸 債務成本
재정보첩 풍험식별 은행신대 채무성본
Fiscal Subsidies, Risk Identification, Bank Credit, Debt Cost
银行信贷是中国企业最重要的资本来源,信贷资源配置的决定因素和定价机制也是银行、企业、学界及其他相关方关注的重点。本文通过理论分析认为财政补贴作为政府对企业的隐性担保机制,能降低银行对企业的风险评估,进而降低企业债务成本。基于此,本文以沪深两市2007—2012年公司数据为样本,实证检验银行风险识别能力、政府财政补贴和企业债务成本的关系。研究发现银行在信贷资源定价上具备显著的风险识别能力,对高风险公司要求更高的利率。财政补贴有降低银行风险评估级别,从而降低公司债务融资成本的作用,但该作用只在财政补贴力度足够大,使公司由营业利润小于零的高风险公司变为盈利公司时才显著。说明在银行重视信贷风险管理的市场行为下,政府有重点、有针对性的财政补贴能引导信贷资源优化配置。
銀行信貸是中國企業最重要的資本來源,信貸資源配置的決定因素和定價機製也是銀行、企業、學界及其他相關方關註的重點。本文通過理論分析認為財政補貼作為政府對企業的隱性擔保機製,能降低銀行對企業的風險評估,進而降低企業債務成本。基于此,本文以滬深兩市2007—2012年公司數據為樣本,實證檢驗銀行風險識彆能力、政府財政補貼和企業債務成本的關繫。研究髮現銀行在信貸資源定價上具備顯著的風險識彆能力,對高風險公司要求更高的利率。財政補貼有降低銀行風險評估級彆,從而降低公司債務融資成本的作用,但該作用隻在財政補貼力度足夠大,使公司由營業利潤小于零的高風險公司變為盈利公司時纔顯著。說明在銀行重視信貸風險管理的市場行為下,政府有重點、有針對性的財政補貼能引導信貸資源優化配置。
은행신대시중국기업최중요적자본래원,신대자원배치적결정인소화정개궤제야시은행、기업、학계급기타상관방관주적중점。본문통과이론분석인위재정보첩작위정부대기업적은성담보궤제,능강저은행대기업적풍험평고,진이강저기업채무성본。기우차,본문이호심량시2007—2012년공사수거위양본,실증검험은행풍험식별능력、정부재정보첩화기업채무성본적관계。연구발현은행재신대자원정개상구비현저적풍험식별능력,대고풍험공사요구경고적리솔。재정보첩유강저은행풍험평고급별,종이강저공사채무융자성본적작용,단해작용지재재정보첩력도족구대,사공사유영업리윤소우령적고풍험공사변위영리공사시재현저。설명재은행중시신대풍험관리적시장행위하,정부유중점、유침대성적재정보첩능인도신대자원우화배치。
Bank credit is the most important source of determinants of credit resource allocation and pricing capital for the Chinese enterprises, and the mechanism are also the focuses of banks, enterprises, academia and other related parties. Based on theoretical analysis, this paper holds that, as a kind of implicit guarantee, fiscal subsidy can decrease debt cost by degrading the debt risk. Based on this, the paper takes the corporate data from the stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2012 as a sample and conducts an empirical research on the relationship among the bank's ability on risk identification, government subsidies and the corporate debt cost. The result indicates that banks have remarkable ability of risk identification on pricing the credit resource, and demand higher interest rates for high-risk companies. Government subsidies can reduce banks' risk assessment level, so as to reduce the cost of corporate credit financing. However, this effect is significant only when the fiscal subsidy is large enough to turn the high-risk corporate with negative operating profit into the profit-making corporate. This result shows that intensive and purposeful subsidies can optimize the allocation of credit resources when the banks pay attention to the management of credit risks.