CAJ | 학술논문

地方政府的集体利益偏好就是追求预算外收入。以此为逻辑起点,利用1985—2010年省级面板数据的检验表明,官员集团（尤其是中下层官员）＂预算外收入＂的集体利益偏好与高层官员＂政治晋升＂的个体利益偏好、地方政府的利益激励与中央政府的经济增长目标高度共融。不同时期差异显著：1993年以前,地方政府追逐预算外收入可以促进经济增长,但经济增长反过来会抑制地方政府的预算外收入扩张;1993年之后,二者相互促进,且预算外收入对经济增长的产出弹性大于之前。根据两阶段的实证结果差异,可以进一步推知,对于整个地方政府而言,政治晋升激励优先于以预算外收入为主要表现的财政激励。随着现有地方政府行为模式负效应尽显,经济转型亟需优化对地方政府的效用偏好,并增强财政约束与施政过程监督。
지방정부적집체이익편호취시추구예산외수입。이차위라집기점,이용1985—2010년성급면판수거적검험표명,관원집단（우기시중하층관원）＂예산외수입＂적집체이익편호여고층관원＂정치진승＂적개체이익편호、지방정부적이익격려여중앙정부적경제증장목표고도공융。불동시기차이현저：1993년이전,지방정부추축예산외수입가이촉진경제증장,단경제증장반과래회억제지방정부적예산외수입확장;1993년지후,이자상호촉진,차예산외수입대경제증장적산출탄성대우지전。근거량계단적실증결과차이,가이진일보추지,대우정개지방정부이언,정치진승격려우선우이예산외수입위주요표현적재정격려。수착현유지방정부행위모식부효응진현,경제전형극수우화대지방정부적효용편호,병증강재정약속여시정과정감독。
This paper first sets it as logical starting point that local governments＇ collective interest pref- erence is pursuit of extra-budgetary revenue, and conducts empirical researches with the 1985 -2010 provin- cial panel data. The results show that collective interest preference for extra-budgetary revenue is harmony with senior individual preference for promotion, and local government self-interest predilection integrates in- to overall goals of central government. The relationship significantly differs in different periods. Economic growth restrained self-interest expansion of local governments before 1993, while both promotes mutually after 1993, facilitating effect of latter exceeds that of previous period. According to the result difference of two period, it can be further obtained that promotion incentive precede financial incentive which mainly shows extra-budgetary revenue for local governments. As negative effects of the existing behavior pattern all appear, economic transition must optimize utility preference of local governments, and strengthen fiscal con- straint and supervision of administration process.