预测
預測
예측
Forecasting
2014年
5期
76~80
,共null页
低碳 碳总量限制和排放交易 供应链 收益共享契约 零售商驱动
低碳 碳總量限製和排放交易 供應鏈 收益共享契約 零售商驅動
저탄 탄총량한제화배방교역 공응련 수익공향계약 령수상구동
low-carbon; cap and trade ; supply chain; revenue-sharing contract; retailer-driven
低碳环境下考虑产品碳排放约束,本文研究了由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链的协调机制设计问题。假定产品市场需求受减排率影响,设计了由零售商驱动的收益共享契约进行供应链协调。首先分析了政府实施碳总量限制和排放交易政策下,零售商不提供契约时,制造商和零售商各自的利润;而后研究了零售商提供收益共享契约时双方的博弈决策过程,建立了以零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,得到了制造商的最优减排率和零售商的最优分享比例;通过对比发现零售商提供收益共享契约后,能激励制造商提高产品的减排率,增加供应链双方的利润,实现了Pareto改进。
低碳環境下攷慮產品碳排放約束,本文研究瞭由單箇製造商和單箇零售商組成的供應鏈的協調機製設計問題。假定產品市場需求受減排率影響,設計瞭由零售商驅動的收益共享契約進行供應鏈協調。首先分析瞭政府實施碳總量限製和排放交易政策下,零售商不提供契約時,製造商和零售商各自的利潤;而後研究瞭零售商提供收益共享契約時雙方的博弈決策過程,建立瞭以零售商為主方、製造商為從方的Stackelberg主從博弈模型,得到瞭製造商的最優減排率和零售商的最優分享比例;通過對比髮現零售商提供收益共享契約後,能激勵製造商提高產品的減排率,增加供應鏈雙方的利潤,實現瞭Pareto改進。
저탄배경하고필산품탄배방약속,본문연구료유단개제조상화단개령수상조성적공응련적협조궤제설계문제。가정산품시장수구수감배솔영향,설계료유령수상구동적수익공향계약진행공응련협조。수선분석료정부실시탄총량한제화배방교역정책하,령수상불제공계약시,제조상화령수상각자적리윤;이후연구료령수상제공수익공향계약시쌍방적박혁결책과정,건립료이령수상위주방、제조상위종방적Stackelberg주종박혁모형,득도료제조상적최우감배솔화령수상적최우분향비례;통과대비발현령수상제공수익공향계약후,능격려제조상제고산품적감배솔,증가공응련쌍방적리윤,실현료Pareto개진。
In this paper, we study the coordination mechanism design of the supply chain which consists of one supplier and one retailer with the constraint of product carbon emissions. Based on the hypothesis that demand is affected by emission reduction rate, we develop a retailer-driven revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Under the Cap and Trade regulation, we first analyze the optimal decision of supplier and retailer without the revenue-sharing contract and then establish a Stackelberg game model where the retailer act as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower to obtain the optimal emission reduction rate and sharing ratio. By contrasting different situations, we show that revenue-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to improve the emission reduction rate, increase the profit of the supply chain and realize the Pareto improvement.
