经济学家
經濟學傢
경제학가
Economist
2014年
10期
94~102
,共null页
地方政府行为 债务积累 经济人假设 逆向选择
地方政府行為 債務積纍 經濟人假設 逆嚮選擇
지방정부행위 채무적루 경제인가설 역향선택
Local government behavior; Debt accumulation; Hypothesis of economic man; Adverse selection
地方政府行为对债务积累起着关键作用。地方政府不但是地方的管理者和公共物品的提供者，而且它更是一个组织，符合“经济人”假设。在垂直集中的选拔制度、以GDP作为主要指标的考核制度与中国特色的财政联邦制度等多重约束下，我国地方政府有着增加投资的巨大激励，并有典型的“利己主义”即腐败和“道德困境”即深信中央政府会“兜底”的特征，结果造成了地方债务高垒。构建地方政府资产负债表、改变单纯以GDP为主要指标的考核制度及实施举债追责制是控制地方债务风险的解决办法。
地方政府行為對債務積纍起著關鍵作用。地方政府不但是地方的管理者和公共物品的提供者，而且它更是一箇組織，符閤“經濟人”假設。在垂直集中的選拔製度、以GDP作為主要指標的攷覈製度與中國特色的財政聯邦製度等多重約束下，我國地方政府有著增加投資的巨大激勵，併有典型的“利己主義”即腐敗和“道德睏境”即深信中央政府會“兜底”的特徵，結果造成瞭地方債務高壘。構建地方政府資產負債錶、改變單純以GDP為主要指標的攷覈製度及實施舉債追責製是控製地方債務風險的解決辦法。
지방정부행위대채무적루기착관건작용。지방정부불단시지방적관리자화공공물품적제공자，이차타경시일개조직，부합“경제인”가설。재수직집중적선발제도、이GDP작위주요지표적고핵제도여중국특색적재정련방제도등다중약속하，아국지방정부유착증가투자적거대격려，병유전형적“이기주의”즉부패화“도덕곤경”즉심신중앙정부회“두저”적특정，결과조성료지방채무고루。구건지방정부자산부채표、개변단순이GDP위주요지표적고핵제도급실시거채추책제시공제지방채무풍험적해결판법。
The behavior of local government plays a key role in debt accumulation. Local government is not only local manager and provider of public goods but also an organization which conforms to the hypothesis of＂economic man＂ . Under the multi con- straints, such as vertical concentrated selection system, the assessment system of taking GDP as the major indicator and federal fiscal system with Chinese characteristics etc., Chinese local government has great incentive to increase input. It takes the features of typical＂egoism＂, i.e. corruption, and＂moral dilemma＂, i.e. believing the central government will＂solve all the problems＂. As a result, the level of local government debt becomes higher and higher. To control the risk of local government debt, it is necessary to construct local government asset sheet, change the assessment system of taking GDP as the sole standard and implement debt accountability system.
