管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2014年
3期
11~17
,共null页
高艳慧 万迪昉 吴祖光 赵晓琴
高豔慧 萬迪昉 吳祖光 趙曉琴
고염혜 만적방 오조광 조효금
所有权配置 合作R&D效率 固定权益 动态权益 实验研究
所有權配置 閤作R&D效率 固定權益 動態權益 實驗研究
소유권배치 합작R&D효솔 고정권익 동태권익 실험연구
allocation of ownership rights; efficiency of cooperative R&D; fixed ownership rights; dynamic ownership rights; experiment
设计合理的所有权配置合约是合作R&D过程中的重要环节,促进合作R&D效率是中国创新面临的关键问题之一.本研究通过构建基本的两阶段合作R&D框架,运用实验研究方法,对所有权配置比例与合作双方两阶段投入的影响以及动态所有权配置方式在激励合作R&D方面的优势进行了分析.结果表明,双方的投入与所有权分配的比例正相关;可转债合约下的动态权益分配方式对于双方的激励作用高于固定权益合约.并且在固定权益契约下,开发阶段双方的投入均与研究阶段双方的投入显著正相关;在可转债契约下,对方在研究阶段的投入对自身开发阶段投入的影响减弱.另外,在可转债契约下,随着研究机构投入水平的增加,企业执行转股期权的可能性增强.
設計閤理的所有權配置閤約是閤作R&D過程中的重要環節,促進閤作R&D效率是中國創新麵臨的關鍵問題之一.本研究通過構建基本的兩階段閤作R&D框架,運用實驗研究方法,對所有權配置比例與閤作雙方兩階段投入的影響以及動態所有權配置方式在激勵閤作R&D方麵的優勢進行瞭分析.結果錶明,雙方的投入與所有權分配的比例正相關;可轉債閤約下的動態權益分配方式對于雙方的激勵作用高于固定權益閤約.併且在固定權益契約下,開髮階段雙方的投入均與研究階段雙方的投入顯著正相關;在可轉債契約下,對方在研究階段的投入對自身開髮階段投入的影響減弱.另外,在可轉債契約下,隨著研究機構投入水平的增加,企業執行轉股期權的可能性增彊.
설계합리적소유권배치합약시합작R&D과정중적중요배절,촉진합작R&D효솔시중국창신면림적관건문제지일.본연구통과구건기본적량계단합작R&D광가,운용실험연구방법,대소유권배치비례여합작쌍방량계단투입적영향이급동태소유권배치방식재격려합작R&D방면적우세진행료분석.결과표명,쌍방적투입여소유권분배적비례정상관;가전채합약하적동태권익분배방식대우쌍방적격려작용고우고정권익합약.병차재고정권익계약하,개발계단쌍방적투입균여연구계단쌍방적투입현저정상관;재가전채계약하,대방재연구계단적투입대자신개발계단투입적영향감약.령외,재가전채계약하,수착연구궤구투입수평적증가,기업집행전고기권적가능성증강.
Innovation is a source of business transformation and an approach to achieving competitive advantage.However,the rapid technological advancement and the rapidly changing consumer demand are making it difficult for companies to achieve the full advantage of resources and technology.Hence,seeking cooperation with research institutions,universities,and companies to complement with each other's strength is a widely used technology innovation strategy.Opportunistic behaviors for the pursuit of unilateral interests in collaborative research and development (R&D) can seriously affect the collaborative innovation efficiency.It is important to encourage cooperation and innovation through ownership allocation.This issue has been discussed considerably by economists and practitioners.Joint ownership is considered the main configuration.Two conflicting viewpoints dominate the discussion of the current literature.One view is that equal or approximately equal allocation of ownership makes the private benefits of control no longer exist.The other view is that peer to peer ownership provides the least efficient incentive.In addition,the current theoretical models point out the importance of the dynamic allocation of ownership,but lack of empirical examination.The design of a reasonable contract including ownership allocation is an important part of the cooperative R&D.Besides,promoting cooperative R&D efficiency is one of key issues faced by Chinese innovation.This study constructs a basic two-phase cooperative R & D framework and analyzes the impact of ownership allocation on partners' inputs over two stages,and the advantage of dynamic allocation of ownership in incentives using experimental research method.The results show that partners' inputs are positively related to ownership.Dynamic allocation of ownership under convertible bonds contract has higher incentives on the partners than the contract with fixed ownership rights.In addition,the inputs at development stage are positively related to the inputs at research stage under the contract of fixed allocation of ownership.Under the contract of convertible bond,the impact of partner's investment at research stage on self-investment at development stage is weakened.With increasing input level of research institutions,enterprises would implement the conversion option under the contract of convertible bond.