CAJ | 학술논문

基于供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈假设,对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链中三种购销营运模式（预订购、委托代销和组合模式）的运作及契约双方的博弈顺序进行了分析,并构建了供应链融资和营运协同决策模型.研究表明,资金充足供应链中,供应商的最优状况相当于传统报童模型下的优化问题,且会采用委托代销营运模式.为实现最优决策,资金约束供应商会采用外部融资和供应链内部资金转让的组合融资方案,且会选择预订购和委托代销组合营运策略.资金约束供应链中供应商愿意与零售商分担产品市场风险,激励零售商预订购,增加供应链的整体收益.
기우공응상주도적Stackelberg박혁가설,대단일공응상화단일령수상조성적이급공응련중삼충구소영운모식（예정구、위탁대소화조합모식）적운작급계약쌍방적박혁순서진행료분석,병구건료공응련융자화영운협동결책모형.연구표명,자금충족공응련중,공응상적최우상황상당우전통보동모형하적우화문제,차회채용위탁대소영운모식.위실현최우결책,자금약속공응상회채용외부융자화공응련내부자금전양적조합융자방안,차회선택예정구화위탁대소조합영운책략.자금약속공응련중공응상원의여령수상분담산품시장풍험,격려령수상예정구,증가공응련적정체수익.
It is difficult to achieve optimal production or order quantity based on market demand for enterprises in capital-constrained supply chains.Enterprises adopting this approach not only loses development opportunity but has price fluctuation issues inside a supply chain,which will affect the performance of the supply chain.If they break away from capital constraints with the support of financing services and maintain coordination of financing and operation,a new value of the supply chain may be created.The goal of this paper is to provide the optimal solution for the coordination between financing services and operational management in capitalconstrained supply chains.Based on a Stackelberg game with the supplier being the leader,this research explains three supply chain modes,including sole preorder,sole consignment and the combination of these two modes,and analyzes the timeline of the game between sole supplier and sole retailer in two level supply chains.We present the assumptions of decision-making model of supply chain financing and operation to explain optimal decision-making activities about financing and operating coordination in capital-constrained supply chain.We also focus on studying their collaborative decision on financing and operation.Our results show that the optimal decision of the supplier is equivalent to the optimization problem under the traditional newsvendor model when it has sufficient internal capital.Our results also show that there exists the financing level that the supplier and the retailer can at most have under the optimal operational status of production or order quantity.In order to achieve optimal decision,thecapitalconstrained supplier adopts two financing approaches to mitigate its capital limits of external financing and preorder offer.Suppliers will adopt the sole consignment mode when they have sufficient internal capital and will select the combination mode of preorder and consignment when they are short of capital.Our results also show that the profit of the capital-constrained supplier is less than the case if it has sufficient internal capital.The supplier is willing to share market risk of products with the retailer and encourage the retailer to preorderwhich may increase the overall income of the capital-constrained supply chain.The retailer＇ s earnings are improved when the supplier has capital constraint than when the supplier has sufficient internal capital.Finally,some numerical examples are used to illustrate the results obtained in this paper.