管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2014年
3期
174~180
,共null页
损失规避 供应链 混同契约 甄别契约
損失規避 供應鏈 混同契約 甄彆契約
손실규피 공응련 혼동계약 견별계약
loss aversion; supply chain; pooling contract; screening contract
一个零售商和一个供应商组成的供应链系统,零售商以一定的概率具备损失规避特性,供应商根据此概率大小设计交易契约最大化自身利润.首先,采用博弈和激励机制理论,分别研究了混同契约和甄别契约的设计过程.在混同契约下,供应商针对不同类型的零售商制定统一批发价格,零售商根据该批发价格决定其最优订货量;在甄别契约下,供应商通过设计契约菜单激励零售商显示其真实的损失规避特性.得出,当产品生产成本较低时,供应商可以设计出有效的甄别契约,通过比较混同与甄别契约下的供应商最优期望利润得到最优契约;而当产品成本较高时,不存在有效的甄别契约,此时混同契约即为最优契约.其次,通过数值模拟,对比了在产品生产成本较低时的两种契约下,零售商具有损失规避特征的概率及其损失规避程度对供应商期望利润及零售商期望效用、期望利润的影响;得出,当存在有效的甄别契约时,供应商采用甄别契约总比采用混同契约所得的期望利润更高.
一箇零售商和一箇供應商組成的供應鏈繫統,零售商以一定的概率具備損失規避特性,供應商根據此概率大小設計交易契約最大化自身利潤.首先,採用博弈和激勵機製理論,分彆研究瞭混同契約和甄彆契約的設計過程.在混同契約下,供應商針對不同類型的零售商製定統一批髮價格,零售商根據該批髮價格決定其最優訂貨量;在甄彆契約下,供應商通過設計契約菜單激勵零售商顯示其真實的損失規避特性.得齣,噹產品生產成本較低時,供應商可以設計齣有效的甄彆契約,通過比較混同與甄彆契約下的供應商最優期望利潤得到最優契約;而噹產品成本較高時,不存在有效的甄彆契約,此時混同契約即為最優契約.其次,通過數值模擬,對比瞭在產品生產成本較低時的兩種契約下,零售商具有損失規避特徵的概率及其損失規避程度對供應商期望利潤及零售商期望效用、期望利潤的影響;得齣,噹存在有效的甄彆契約時,供應商採用甄彆契約總比採用混同契約所得的期望利潤更高.
일개령수상화일개공응상조성적공응련계통,령수상이일정적개솔구비손실규피특성,공응상근거차개솔대소설계교역계약최대화자신리윤.수선,채용박혁화격려궤제이론,분별연구료혼동계약화견별계약적설계과정.재혼동계약하,공응상침대불동류형적령수상제정통일비발개격,령수상근거해비발개격결정기최우정화량;재견별계약하,공응상통과설계계약채단격려령수상현시기진실적손실규피특성.득출,당산품생산성본교저시,공응상가이설계출유효적견별계약,통과비교혼동여견별계약하적공응상최우기망리윤득도최우계약;이당산품성본교고시,불존재유효적견별계약,차시혼동계약즉위최우계약.기차,통과수치모의,대비료재산품생산성본교저시적량충계약하,령수상구유손실규피특정적개솔급기손실규피정도대공응상기망리윤급령수상기망효용、기망리윤적영향;득출,당존재유효적견별계약시,공응상채용견별계약총비채용혼동계약소득적기망리윤경고.
This paper incorporates loss aversion into the newsvendor framework by assuming that there are psychological costs of leftovers and stock-outs based on the asymmetry theory of losses and gains with respect to a reference point.Accordingly,this paper analyzes the impact of loss aversion on contract design in the supply chain system by constructing a subjective utility function of the loss-averse member and postulating the loss aversion character as private information.The outline of this paper is as follows.In section 1,we review the existing literatures about how loss aversion affects supply chain members'behaviors and how to design a supply contract under asymmetric information.In section 2,we establish a supply chain system composed of a rational supplier and a retailer with a probability of owning loss aversion character.The supplier's task is to develop optimal contracts (i.e.,pooling contract or screening contract) to maximize its expected profit given the probability of the retailer's owning loss aversion character.In sections 3 and 4,we propose the design processes of the pooling contract and screening contract respectively:Under the pooling contract,the supplier decides the unified wholesale price for two different types of retailers (i.e.,loss-averse retailer and loss-neutral retailer).The retailer determines the order quantity according to its type.Under the screening contract,the supplier designs a contract menu containing both wholesale prices and order quantities in order to disclose the retailer's true type.In section 5,we establish some linear relationships between unit psychological costs and the product 's sale price.We further compare the expected profits (utilities) of the supplier and the retailer under the two contracts through a numerical simulation.Finally,we give concluding remarks in section 6.We obtain the optimal wholesale price for the supplier and optimal order quantity for different retailers under the pooling contract.We find find that the supplier ‘ s optimal wholesale price has a positive correlation with the probability of retailer ‘ s owning loss aversion character and retailer' s unit psychological cost of stock-outs.However,the supplier‘s optimal wholesale price has a negative correlation with retailer' s unit psychological cost of leftovers.In addition,we find that the optimal order quantities of the two types of retailers have a negative correlation with the probability of retailer's owning loss aversion character,but have different correlations with retailer 's unit psychological costs.The loss-neutral retailer 's optimal order quantity has a positive (negative)correlation with the unit psychological cost of leftovers (stock-outs) while the loss-averse retailer's optimal order quantity has a positive correlation with the unit psychological cost of stock-outs and a uncertain correlation with the unit psychological cost of leftovers (depending on the relationship of the unit production cost and other parameters).Under the model of screening contract,we find that effective screening contract can be designed only under the condition that the unit production cost is relatively low and supplier can choose the optimal contract by comparing his optimal expected profits under the two contracts.Otherwise,the pooling contract is optimal.Our simulation,in which the unit production cost is relatively low,demonstrates that the supplier can achieve a higher expected utility under the screening contract as long as the effective screening contract can be designed.