中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2014年
9期
148~160
,共null页
战略性新兴产业 政府补贴 社会资本 研发创新
戰略性新興產業 政府補貼 社會資本 研髮創新
전략성신흥산업 정부보첩 사회자본 연발창신
strategic emerging industries; government subsidies; social capital; R&D
本文构建了企业社会资本投资和研发创新投资决策模型,系统分析了政府干预能力、消费者分布、知识产权保护等外部环境和政府投资补贴的内部激励影响企业投资决策的机理.并利用战略性新兴产业254家上市公司数据进行了实证检验。研究发现.市场和政府双重失效是造成当前企业热衷于社会资本投资而不是研发创新投资的根源.进行社会资本投资的企业比同等条件下其他企业多获取近一半的政府补贴.这反映出在当前环境下企业社会资本投资的背后隐藏着基于政府补贴的寻租:企业社会资本投资的多少取决于政府干预能力,而非市场竞争程度。政府补贴扭曲了企业投资行为;企业社会资本投资减弱了政府补贴鼓励创新的效果。因此。应当重新审视政府补贴政策.尽快完善补贴细则.切实转变补贴重点.逐步探索补贴退出机制。
本文構建瞭企業社會資本投資和研髮創新投資決策模型,繫統分析瞭政府榦預能力、消費者分佈、知識產權保護等外部環境和政府投資補貼的內部激勵影響企業投資決策的機理.併利用戰略性新興產業254傢上市公司數據進行瞭實證檢驗。研究髮現.市場和政府雙重失效是造成噹前企業熱衷于社會資本投資而不是研髮創新投資的根源.進行社會資本投資的企業比同等條件下其他企業多穫取近一半的政府補貼.這反映齣在噹前環境下企業社會資本投資的揹後隱藏著基于政府補貼的尋租:企業社會資本投資的多少取決于政府榦預能力,而非市場競爭程度。政府補貼扭麯瞭企業投資行為;企業社會資本投資減弱瞭政府補貼鼓勵創新的效果。因此。應噹重新審視政府補貼政策.儘快完善補貼細則.切實轉變補貼重點.逐步探索補貼退齣機製。
본문구건료기업사회자본투자화연발창신투자결책모형,계통분석료정부간예능력、소비자분포、지식산권보호등외부배경화정부투자보첩적내부격려영향기업투자결책적궤리.병이용전략성신흥산업254가상시공사수거진행료실증검험。연구발현.시장화정부쌍중실효시조성당전기업열충우사회자본투자이불시연발창신투자적근원.진행사회자본투자적기업비동등조건하기타기업다획취근일반적정부보첩.저반영출재당전배경하기업사회자본투자적배후은장착기우정부보첩적심조:기업사회자본투자적다소취결우정부간예능력,이비시장경쟁정도。정부보첩뉴곡료기업투자행위;기업사회자본투자감약료정부보첩고려창신적효과。인차。응당중신심시정부보첩정책.진쾌완선보첩세칙.절실전변보첩중점.축보탐색보첩퇴출궤제。
This paper establishes a model about how an enterprise makes the decision between its social capital and R&D investment, and systematically analyses the internal mechanism how an enterprise's investment decision is influenced by not only the external environment, such as the capability of government intervention, the distribution of consumers, and the degree of intellectual property protection, but also the internal incentives for obtaining subsidies through social capital investment. Then, according to the data of strategic emerging enterprises from 254 listed companies, we find that double failure of market and government may be the source of the problem. Under the same condition, the enterprises with social capital investment achieved nearly half more government subsidies than other enterprises. This is reflected that enterprise's social capital investments may be hidden for the exchange of government subsidies under the current system background. Enterprise's social capital investment depends on the capability of government intervention, rather than the ability of competing with others in market. The government subsidies distort the enterprises' investment behavior. Enterprise's social capital investment weakens the effect of government subsidies on encouraging innovation. We should re-examine the policy of government subsidies, perfect the system quickly, shift the focus to the real key point practically and explore the exit mechanism gradually.