CAJ | 학술논문

以国际海运碳交易机制的实施为背景，在考虑船东对减排产品类型偏好具有差异的情况下，基于Hotelling模型，研究提供不同类型减排产品企业之间的竞争策略。通过分析Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈的均衡结果，得到船东对某类减排产品偏好的增加，会促进该类减排产品的价格上涨，市场份额扩大和收益增加。并且，在Stackelberg博弈中，主导企业获得较Nash博弈下更大的收益，而跟随企业的收益变化取决于船东减排偏好与减排产品成本之间的关系。
이국제해운탄교역궤제적실시위배경，재고필선동대감배산품류형편호구유차이적정황하，기우Hotelling모형，연구제공불동류형감배산품기업지간적경쟁책략。통과분석Nash박혁화Stackelberg박혁적균형결과，득도선동대모류감배산품편호적증가，회촉진해류감배산품적개격상창，시장빈액확대화수익증가。병차，재Stackelberg박혁중，주도기업획득교Nash박혁하경대적수익，이근수기업적수익변화취결우선동감배편호여감배산품성본지간적관계。
Under the background of the implementation of Marine Emissions Trading Scheme, this paper studies competitive strategy of different emissions reduction products suppliers using Hotelling model with the consideration of shipowners＇ emissions reduction measure preference. According to Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, this paper concludes that if shipowners have a preference to an emissions reduction measure, price, market share and profit of products in one emission reduction measure will increase if shipowners prefer to this measure. Moreover, leading supplier gets more profit in Stackelberg game than in Nash game. While the change of the profit of suppliers is determined by the relationship between shipowners＇ emissions reduction measure preference and cost of products.