CAJ | 학술논문

不恰当的薪酬激励被公认为金融危机爆发的深层根源之一，优化薪酬结构则是针对性监管政策的关键举措。基于东西方银行薪酬机制差异，本文将银行高管薪酬分解为权力薪酬、激励薪酬及操作薪酬，以2007—2013年上市银行为样本，研究我国银行高管薪酬结构与系统性风险之间的关联。研究发现，银行高管的激励薪酬与系统性风险显著正相关，其传导渠道为期限错配。据此，调整银行高管薪酬结构、强化银行公司治理，应成为纠正不恰当薪酬机制的当务之急。
불흡당적신수격려피공인위금융위궤폭발적심층근원지일，우화신수결구칙시침대성감관정책적관건거조。기우동서방은행신수궤제차이，본문장은행고관신수분해위권력신수、격려신수급조작신수，이2007—2013년상시은행위양본，연구아국은행고관신수결구여계통성풍험지간적관련。연구발현，은행고관적격려신수여계통성풍험현저정상관，기전도거도위기한착배。거차，조정은행고관신수결구、강화은행공사치리，응성위규정불흡당신수궤제적당무지급。
It is generally acknowledged that improper compensation incentive is one of the deep roots of financial crisis. Therefore, optimization of compensation structure is considered as a key measure of pertinent regulation policy. In light of the difference between oriental and occidental banking compensation, this paper separates bank CEO compensation into three parts, i.e. , power compensation, incentive compensation and manipulation compensation and empirically tests the connection between CEO compensation structure and systemic risk sampling with the listed commercial banks from 2007 to 2013. It is evidenced that the incentive compensation has a positive relation with systemic risk contribution significantly, functioning through the maturity mismatch channel. Hereby, it is imperative for the authorities to urge commercial banks to adjust CEO compensation structure and enforce corporate governance to correct the deviation of compensation mechanism.