CAJ | 학술논문

创业企业和创业投资的利益诉求并不完全一致,缔约双方有关行动的选择可能产生潜在的利益冲突,因此,控制权配置成为融资合约的一个重要补充。在不完全合约框架下,单边控制、相机控制和联合控制各有自己的适用条件,每种控制权分配都可以通过融资工具的选择来实现,即控制权分配和融资结构紧密相连。融资额较小时,企业发行无投票权的股权,融资额较大时,发行可转换证券或者债券,更大的融资额需要发行有投票权的股票。这就要求拓宽创业企业的融资工具,尽快引进可转换证券。
창업기업화창업투자적이익소구병불완전일치,체약쌍방유관행동적선택가능산생잠재적이익충돌,인차,공제권배치성위융자합약적일개중요보충。재불완전합약광가하,단변공제、상궤공제화연합공제각유자기적괄용조건,매충공제권분배도가이통과융자공구적선택래실현,즉공제권분배화융자결구긴밀상련。융자액교소시,기업발행무투표권적고권,융자액교대시,발행가전환증권혹자채권,경대적융자액수요발행유투표권적고표。저취요구탁관창업기업적융자공구,진쾌인진가전환증권。
The goal between entrepreneur and venture capital are not entirely consistent. The choice of action may give lead to potential conflicts of interest. Therefore, control rights become an important dimension of financing contracts. In the framework of incomplete contracts, this paper finds that the optimal allocation of control rights are available through the choice of financing instruments to implement, namely, control and financing structures are closely linked. If the amount of financing is small, enterprises issue non-voting equity; if financing amount is large, enterprises issue convertible securities or bonds; if financing amount is larger, enterprises issue the voting shares. We should introduce convertible securities to venture.