CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于九龙坡合作社“二次分红”案例的剖析，在一个扩展的交易成本经济学（TCE）模型内探讨了中国农业产业化经营模式的一般制度特征，并对均衡状态下农业产业化模式的内在不稳定性进行了分析。本文的研究表明，最优农业产业化模式的选择取决于分市场的交易效率，这一模型也揭示了商品契约与要素契约的互补特性，并认为运用跨市场的“补偿”不但可以解决农业产业化模式的内在不稳定性，而且有利于解决产权的谈判力效应与违约诱惑的共生困境。
본문기우구룡파합작사“이차분홍”안례적부석，재일개확전적교역성본경제학（TCE）모형내탐토료중국농업산업화경영모식적일반제도특정，병대균형상태하농업산업화모식적내재불은정성진행료분석。본문적연구표명，최우농업산업화모식적선택취결우분시장적교역효솔，저일모형야게시료상품계약여요소계약적호보특성，병인위운용과시장적“보상”불단가이해결농업산업화모식적내재불은정성，이차유리우해결산권적담판력효응여위약유혹적공생곤경。
Based on the exploration of the pioneering work of ＂Second Dividend＂ by Jiulongpo Cooperative, this paper uses an expanded TCE model to study the general institutional characteristics of China＇s agricultural industrialization modes, and their inherent unsteadiness at equilibrium. We draw the conclusion that the choice of the optimal agricultural industrialization modes depends on the relative market efficiency. Our model also reveals the complementary character of the commodity contract to the factor contract, and further concludes that the introduction of the cross-market ＂Reimbursement＂ not only contributes to the solution of the inherent unsteadiness, but also helps us out of such symbiosis dilemma as ＂the more negotiation rights, the more inducement to break the contract＂.